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Abstract
From a first-hand perspective, the author reviews the mechanisms by which Delaware creates its corporate law, and
identifies various explanations for Delaware’s prominence and its corporate lawmaking (“race” theories, Roe’s
identification of active or dormant federal power as a limiting influence, and Kahan and Rock’s description of
“symbiotic federalism”). Although finding support for all of these accounts, the author maintains that none fully
expresses the considerations that are actually salient for Delaware corporate law policymakers. The author suggests,
rather, that the following considerations are dominant: (1) enhancing flexibility to engage in private ordering, (2)
deferring to case-by-case development of the law, and avoiding legislation that is prescriptive and proscriptive, (3)
avoiding impairment of preexisting contractual relationships and expectations, and (4) most importantly, avoiding
legislative change in the absence of clear and specific practical benefits. Because of the dominance of these
considerations, the author suggests that Delaware is unlikely to expand materially the regulation of corporate actors
by means of either statutory or common law change. While additional federal regulation of corporate governance will
emerge sporadically in response to political crises, any effort by Delaware to anticipate or respond to such additional
federal regulation will involve small steps that will not significantly alter the existing allocation of power and authority
among corporate constituencies.

Introduction
It is well known that among the fifty states, Delaware occupies an outsized place in the formation of business
entities, particularly publicly held corporations.1 There are numerous academic explanations for this phenomenon, with
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The website for Delaware’s Division of Corporations recites that “[m]ore than half a million business entities have their legal
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varied accounts of why and how Delaware corporate law has been developed to achieve that position of prominence.2
To someone from Delaware who has had firsthand involvement with that lawmaking process, these accounts---largely
from observers whose involvement is to some degree more remote---resemble the pronouncements of space explorers
on missions to describe life forms on an alien planet.3 While these pronouncements do engender some awkwardness
over having been probed, they do not and should not strike us, the observed natives, as inherently offensive or flawed.
To the contrary, the objectivity of these reports yields insights that might otherwise never have occurred to us.
In contrast to the extensive literature from outside observers, there are relatively few even partial accounts of
the formation of Delaware corporate law from those who are essentially native to Delaware. This relative dearth is not
necessarily regrettable: Just as outside assessments are not inherently flawed, such firsthand accounts are not
necessarily superior to those of outside observers. A firsthand report can be flawed by a failure to see the reasons for
one’s own actions or inactions, or by a tendency toward self-congratulation or avoidance of self-criticism.
Nevertheless, a Delaware native’s articulation of a subjective sense of why we in Delaware do what we do when it
comes to matters of corporate law might enrich this symposium’s examination of the tensions in the development of
state and federal roles in corporate law.
That articulation is the mission of this overtly firsthand account. Not being written by a judge, it necessarily
can’t report firsthand why Delaware corporate law judges do what they do,4 but it can offer a firsthand sense of
Delaware corporate law policymaking from someone actively involved both as an advocate in corporate litigation and,
in the last eleven years, in the formulation and ongoing amendment (and nonamendment) of the Delaware General
Corporation Law.5
2

E.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Vigorous Race or Leisurely Walk: Reconsidering the Competition over
Corporate Charters, 112 Yale L.J. 553 (2002); William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware, 83
Yale L.J. 663 (1974); Jill E. Fisch, The Peculiar Role Of The Delaware Courts in the Competition for Corporate Charters, 68 U.
Cin. L. Rev. 1061 (2000); Daniel R. Fischel, The “Race to the Bottom” Revisited: Reflections on Recent Developments in
Delaware’s Corporation Law, 76 Nw. U. L. Rev. 913 (1982); Renee M. Jones, Rethinking Corporate Federalism in the Era of
Corporate Reform, 29 J. Corp. L. 625 (2004); Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Symbiotic Federalism and the Structure of
Corporate Law, 58 Vand. L. Rev. 1573 (2005); Ehud Kamar, A Regulatory Competition Theory of Indeterminacy in Corporate
Law, 98 Colum. L. Rev. 1908 (1998); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Toward an Interest-Group Theory of Delaware
Corporate Law, 65 Tex. L. Rev. 469 (1987); Brett H. McDonnell, Two Cheers for Corporate Law Federalism, 30 J. Corp. L. 99
(2004); Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Competition, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 590 (2003) [hereinafter Roe, Delaware’s Competition]; Mark J.
Roe, Delaware’s Politics, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 2493 (2005) [hereinafter Roe, Delaware’s Politics]; Roberta Romano, The State
Competition Debate in Corporate Law, 8 Cardozo L. Rev. 709 (1987) [hereinafter Romano, State Competition]; Ralph K. Winter,
State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. Legal Stud. 251 (1977).
3
This characterization is inspired by Professor James Gordon’s spectacularly creative assessment of Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494
U.S. 56 (1990), in which he describes a mission from planet Zerix to gather intelligence from Earth about the treatment of notes as
securities. James D. Gordon III, Interplanetary Intelligence About Promissory Notes as Securities, 69 Tex. L. Rev. 383, 385
(1990).
4
Increasingly in recent years, the judges themselves have published their own accounts on this topic. See Kahan & Rock, supra
note 2, at 1603 n.117 (citing extensive publication by judges of Delaware Supreme Court and Court of Chancery).
5
This footnote bears the burden of disclosing the basis for the observations in this paper. I practiced law from 1976 to 1994 with
the Wilmington, Delaware law firm of Morris, Nichols, Arsht & Tunnell. That period coincided with the rapid development of
Delaware’s takeover jurisprudence and of the law of corporate fiduciary duty in general. See, e.g., Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v.
QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 45-48 (Del. 1994) (refining application of enhanced judicial scrutiny in mergers) ; Paramount
Commc’ns Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1152-53 (Del. 1989) (rejecting claim that cash tender offer for all shares could not
constitute cognizable threat to shareholder interests); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182-84
(Del. 1986) (articulating directors’ obligations in sale of company); Moran v. Household Int’l Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1357 (Del.

- -

2

Part I describes the two principal policymaking agencies of Delaware corporate law: (1) the state legislature
(the Delaware General Assembly) and its partner in corporate legislative lawmaking, the Delaware State Bar
Association; and (2) the state courts (specifically, the Court of Chancery and its reviewing court, the Delaware
Supreme Court).
Part II summarizes some of the outside accounts of the formation of Delaware corporate law. As this section
goes on to explain, every one of these accounts has some support, both intuitive and factual. As will also be explained,
however, none is entirely accurate or complete, at least judged from the perspective of firsthand involvement with the
formation of Delaware corporate law.
Part III attempts to distill---again, from a firsthand perspective---the policy considerations that underlie the
development of Delaware corporate law. What emerges is a picture in which the policymakers are attentive to, and
respond to, interstate competitive threats as well as potential federal expansion in the field of corporate law. Within
those very broad limits, however, these policymakers act on conventional notions of (1) enhancing flexibility to engage
in private ordering, (2) deferring to case-by-case development of the law, and avoiding legislation that is prescriptive
and proscriptive, (3) avoiding impairment of preexisting contractual relationships and expectations, and (4) most
importantly, avoiding legislative change in the absence of clear and specific practical benefits.6 Above all, Delaware
corporate law is conservative.
This inherent conservatism will significantly affect the course of federal and state roles in regulating corporate
governance. Delaware is unlikely to expand materially the regulation of corporate actors by means of either statutory
or common law change. Additional federal regulation will emerge sporadically in response to political crises in which
matters of corporate governance take on political salience beyond the management and shareholder groups that are
ordinarily involved in such matters.7 Delaware can do and will do little if anything to stand in the way of such
responses. Any effort by Delaware to head off such additional federal regulation of corporate governance will involve
small steps that will not significantly alter the existing allocation of power and authority among corporate
constituencies.
1985) (upholding shareholder right plans); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954-55 (Del. 1985) (articulating
standards of review of board-adopted takeover defenses); Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872-73 (Del. 1985) (articulating
directors’ fiduciary duty of care in approving merger). My former law firm was directly involved as counsel in many of these
cases, and I participated personally in a number of them. I have been a member of the Corporation Law Section of the Delaware
State Bar Association for about 30 years. Since 1995, I have been a member of the Council of that Section, which serves as the
primary source of initiatives to revise the Delaware General Corporation Law. My experience with the Council is the basis for
several observations concerning the Council’s informal practices and certain of its substantive discussions of proposed legislation.
With this recitation of background, however, comes the inevitable and appropriate qualification that the assessments and
assertions in this paper are solely my own and do not represent the views of my former firm, the Bar Association, the Section, or
the Council, each of which has been composed of many individuals, each with his or her own views about the content and
motivation of his or her activities in the field of corporate law.
6
These are not at all new conceptions of the bases for good corporate law. See, e.g., William Klein, Criteria for Good Laws of
Business Association, 2 Berkeley Bus. L.J. 13, 15--16 (2005) (outlining four broad categories of criteria for good business
association laws); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Competing Concepts of the Corporation (a.k.a. Criteria? Just Say No), 2 Berkeley Bus.
L.J. 77, 79--80 (2005) (discussing William Klein’s criteria for good business association laws).
7
See Roe, Delaware’s Politics, supra note 2, at 2493 (“[W]hen media saliency puts the matter on the federal agenda or when
Delaware's primary players disagree or when the matter strikes Washington players as important to the American economy,
Delaware loses its dominance.”), 2541-42.
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I.

The Participants in Delaware Corporate Lawmaking
A.

The Delaware General Assembly and the Delaware State Bar Association

At the formal apex of the structure of Delaware corporate law is the Delaware General Corporation Law
(DGCL), the basic organization and content of which have remained essentially unchanged for approximately forty
years.8 Although the Delaware State Constitution is formally superior in authority to the DGCL, there is now only one
constitutional provision of any continuing importance in Delaware corporate law.9 That provision, specifying that
amendments to the DGCL require a two-thirds vote of both the State Senate and the House of Representatives,10 has
been touted as a source of stability of the Delaware corporate law.11 In truth, the supermajority legislative vote
requirement is more symbolic than real, since voting on amendments to the DGCL is almost invariably unanimous.12
Plainly, then, the Delaware General Assembly has not perceived the content of the DGCL as an appropriate subject for
partisan controversy.13
Of course, lack of partisan controversy cannot be taken as evidence of lack of interest. Just as the
disproportionate role of Delaware in corporate chartering is well known, so is the financial importance of that activity
to the State’s fiscal health.14 Revenue from the state corporate franchise tax alone has in recent years constituted over
twenty percent of the state’s budget, a fact of which Delaware legislators are intensely aware.15 Incidental benefits
from the prevalence of Delaware incorporation undoubtedly account for a substantial additional percentage of state
8

Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, §§ 101--398 ([ ]). This statute was substantially revised in 1967 based on the work of a specially
appointed commission comprised principally of Delaware corporate lawyers, and the statute has been modified only incrementally
since then. David A. Drexler et al., Delaware Corporation Law and Practice § 1.01, at 1-4 to 1-5 (2005) (giving brief history of
statute).
9
In 2004 the Delaware General Assembly eliminated the longstanding provision of the State Constitution specifying the required
form of consideration for the issuance of corporate stock. See Frederick H. Alexander and Jeffrey R. Wolters, Analysis of the
2004 Amendments to the Delaware General Corporation Law 1, 3--4 (2004). Delaware’s State Constitution is unusual, if not
unique, in that it can be amended by the General Assembly itself, with no popular vote. Del. Const. art. XVI, § 1. Additionally,
the General Assembly, by a two-thirds vote of both houses, can submit to the voters the question whether to convene a state
constitutional convention. Id. § 2. The greater authority and dignity accorded to the State Constitution derives from the fact that
an amendment must be adopted by both houses of the General Assembly in successive legislative sessions, ostensibly to afford the
electorate the opportunity, before the amendment can be approved in the second legislative session, to vote out incumbents who
initially approve an amendment in the first session. See Randy J. Holland ed., The Delaware Constitution of 1897: The First One
Hundred Years 211 (Del. State Bar Ass’n 1997) (describing amendment process).
10
Del. Const. art. IX, § 1.
11
See Romano, State Competition, supra note 2, at 722 (noting that constitutional two-thirds vote requirement “makes it difficult
to renege on provisions already in the code and, correspondingly, on the overall policy of being responsive to firms”); Omri
Yadlin, Management and Control of the Modern Business Corporation: Corporate Speech and Citizenship: Commentary on
Sitkoff, 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1167, 1185--86 (2002) (arguing that while Delaware’s two-thirds majority requirement ensures
stability, it only reduces extortion if preference for status quo and trustworthy judiciary are assumed).
12
Kahan & Rock, supra note 2, at 1600.
13
Id. (citing Curtis Alva, Delaware and the Market for Corporate Charters: History and Agency, 15 Del. J. Corp. L. 885, 898
(1990)).
14
See, e.g., Del. Dep’t of State, Div. of Corps., 2005 Annual Report 2 (2006), available at
http://www.state.de.us/corp/2005%20doc%20ar.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (“Revenues collected by the Division
[of Corporations] increased 2.2% from $612.8 million in fiscal year 2004 to a new record of $626.1 million in fiscal year 2005.”).
15
Id. (“Incorporations revenue accounted for 22 percent of the State’s general fund in fiscal year 2005.”).
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revenues.16 It is therefore not surprising that when proposed amendments to the DGCL are presented for legislative
consideration, as they are essentially every year, they are very promptly brought to a vote before the appropriate
committee and the floor of both houses.17
The members of the Delaware General Assembly, however, have not taken on any significant role in initiating
or drafting changes to the DGCL.18 Nor are those amendments the product of any legislative staff, or of any lobbyists
engaged by individual businesses. Likewise, and in light of the large number of Delaware public corporations, the
drafting of the DGCL is not dominated by any one Delaware corporation.19 Rather, for decades now the function of
identifying and crafting legislative initiatives in the field of corporate law has been performed by the Corporation Law
Section of the Delaware State Bar Association.20 In particular, it is the governing body of the Corporation Law
Section---its Council---that develops such initiatives.21
16

Revenues to the State that flow indirectly from incorporation in Delaware but economic activity largely centered elsewhere
include: fees for U.C.C. filings based on the borrower’s state of incorporation, id. (noting dramatic growth in U.C.C. filing fees
following July 2001 adoption of revisions to Article IX of Uniform Commercial Code); funds escheated based on Delaware
incorporation, see, e.g., Delaware v. New York, 507 U.S. 490, 494 (1993); and state tax on income earned in Delaware by
corporate service providers, lawyers, and related support service industries, where such income relates to interpretation and
enforcement of Delaware’s corporation law or to bankruptcy litigation based on the debtor’s incorporation in Delaware. 28
U.S.C. § 1408 (venue for corporate bankruptcy reorganization proceedings may include corporate domicile); see David A. Skeel,
Jr., Bankruptcy Judges and Bankruptcy Venue: Some Thoughts on Delaware, 1 Del. L. Rev. 1, 16--18 (1998) (describing history
of Delaware’s rise to prominence in bankruptcy law).
17
In 2004, for example, proposed amendments to the DGCL (in the form of Senate Bill No. 272) were introduced on May 4,
2004; a similar bill was substituted and approved by the Senate Judiciary Committee on May 12, 2004 (S.S. 1 for S.B. 272); that
bill was approved by the Senate on June 1, 2004; approved by the House Judiciary Committee on June 9, 2004; passed by the
House on June 15, 2004; and signed by the Governor on July 6, 2004. State of Del., 142d General Assembly Bill Tracking for
S.S. 1, at
http://www.legis.state.de.us/LIS/LIS142.NSF/04e8b79d21032ccd852568700053e5b5/8b1eea82b256ce9485256e8c00617af0?Ope
nDocument (last visited Aug. 9, 2006) (on file with the Columbia Law Review). In 2006, proposed amendments to the DGCL (in
the form of S.B. 322) were introduced on May 16, 2006; approved by the Senate Judiciary Committee on May 31, 2006; passed
by the Senate on June 7, 2006; approved by the House Judiciary Committee on June 14, 2006; passed by the House on June 20,
2006; and signed by the Governor on June 27, 2006. State of Del., 143d General Assembly Bill Tracking for S.B. 322, at
http://www.legis.state.de.us/LIS/LIS143.nsf/vwLegislation/SB+322?Opendocument (last visited Aug. 9, 2006) (on file with the
Columbia Law Review).
18
It should not be inferred that the Delaware General Assembly is thoroughly passive and ignorant with respect to corporate law
issues. The current chair of the House Judiciary Committee (the committee to which corporate legislation is referred) is an
experienced practitioner of corporate law. See Biography of Representative Robert J. Valihura, Jr., at
http://www.valihura.com/OTHER%20SECTIONS/biography.htm (last visited Aug. 9, 2006) (on file with the Columbia Law
Review). Moreover, members of the various houses and committees of the General Assembly invariably expect and receive oral
presentations from the drafters of proposed amendments to the DGCL explaining the origins and purposes of such amendments.
19
See Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Delaware Way: How We Do Corporate Law and Some of the New Challenges We (and Europe)
Face, 30 Del. J. Corp. L. 673, 679--80 (2005) [hereinafter Strine, Delaware Way] (“[I]t is vital that we remain the leader in
corporation law. . . . For that reason, our state will not tilt its corporation law to favor a corporation that happens to have its
headquarters here. . . . The cost to our integrity and our ability to preserve our advantage . . . would be too high.”).
20
The Delaware State Bar Association is a nonunified (voluntary) organization of members of the Delaware Bar. See generally
Profile of the Delaware State Bar Association, at http://www.dsba.org/GenInfo/profile.htm (last visited Aug. 9, 2006) (on file with
the Columbia Law Review) (providing history and information about organization). Like the American Bar Association, many of
its activities proceed under the auspices of significantly autonomous sections, including the Corporation Law Section, each with
its own membership, bylaws, governing body, and officers. See Sections of the Delaware State Bar Association, at
http://www.dsba.org/SecComm/sectionslist.htm (last visited Aug. 9, 2006) (on file with the Columbia Law Review); Am. Bar
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Because of the Council’s central importance in the development of the Delaware General Corporation Law,
then, its composition and processes deserve brief elaboration. The Council currently consists of twenty-one members,
formally elected annually by the members of the Corporation Law Section.22 A number of informal traditions guide the
selection of nominees to the Council. As a matter of practice, and in recognition of the size of their corporate practice
groups, seven of the large commercial law firms in Wilmington have nominated two members each; the other members
practice in smaller firms (or in my case, teach), all in Wilmington.23 The members are about evenly distributed
between those whose practices concentrate on litigation and those whose practices gravitate toward transactional
counseling. Also as a matter of practice, the members of the Council include a number of lawyers---a small minority,
to be sure---whose litigation practice is dominated by representation of shareholder plaintiffs.24 In 2005, after one
Wilmington firm had developed an ongoing client base of public institutional investors, the size of the Council was
expanded to permit that firm to nominate a member.25 Notably absent from the Council, on the other hand, are any inhouse lawyers (i.e., lawyers employed by and primarily representing a single business), any non-Delaware lawyers, and
with one exception, any lawyers from firms not principally based in Delaware.26
The Council’s schedule is shaped by the schedule of the Delaware General Assembly, which convenes every
January and generates legislation in a crescendo of activity culminating on June 30, when it adjourns its regular
session.27 In order to present legislation for action by the General Assembly, the Council conducts monthly meetings
from August through March or April. Shortly before that cycle begins in late summer, Council members are invited to
suggest potential amendments, and such suggestions are considered by the full Council to determine whether they merit
further exploration. If so, the matter is ordinarily referred to a subcommittee of the Council for detailed review and
drafting. It is common for subcommittee proposals to be reviewed by the Council and “remanded” for revision,
sometimes twice or more. Upon approval by the full Council, however, the legislative proposal is submitted to the

Ass’n, Constititution and Bylaws 19--20, available at http://www.abanet.org/policy/cb0304.pdf (last visited Aug. 9, 2006) (on file
with the Columbia Law Review).
21
Kahan & Rock, supra note 2, at 1600.
22
By-Laws of the Section of Corporation Law of the Delaware State Bar Association § 6.1 (undated) (unpublished bylaws on file
with author). Representing the Division of Corporations of the Department of State, the Assistant Secretary of State participates
in meetings of the Council on an ex officio basis. Richard Geisenberger, the current Assistant Secretary of State, has actively and
productively fulfilled the role of communicating to the Council and having it address the administrative needs of the Division of
Corporations that affect or may be affected by potential amendments to the DGCL.
23
Report from the Corporation Law Section to the Delaware State Bar Association Executive Committee (2006) (unpublished
compendium of Bar Association Section reports, on file with author) (identifying Council members and Corporation Law Section
officers). Firms represented on the Council (and the number of their respective representatives) are: Ashby & Geddes (1);
Connolly Bove Lodge & Hutz (1); Grant & Eisenhofer (1); Morris, James, Hitchens & Williams (2); Morris, Nichols, Arsht &
Tunnell (2); Potter Anderson & Corroon (2); Prickett Jones & Elliott (2); Proctor Heyman (1); Richards Layton & Finger (2);
Rosenthal Monhait Gross & Goddess (1); Skadden Arps Slate Meagher & Flom (2); Smith Katzenstein & Furlow (1); Young
Conaway Stargatt & Taylor (2).
24
These categories---litigators vs. transactional lawyers, plaintiffs’ vs. defendants’ lawyers---are oversimplified. Most of the
Council members have had at least some involvement in all four of these quadrants.
25
Grant & Eisenhofer, P.A. nominated Stuart M. Grant, Esquire to serve on the Council. For a description of that firm and of Mr.
Grant’s practice, see http://www.gelaw.com/about_us.html.
26
That exception is Skadden Arps Slate Meagher & Flom LLP, which by Delaware standards has a large corporate practice based
in Wilmington and has nominated two members of the Council.
27
Del. Const. art. II, § 4.
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Corporation Law Section and the Bar Association’s Executive Committee, as explained below, before submission to
the General Assembly.28
One aspect of the Council’s processes deserves particular mention. For better or worse---and Council members
would almost certainly say for better---the work of the Council proceeds in private. There is a strongly held tradition
that preliminary or potential legislative proposals are not to be discussed with or disseminated to persons outside the
firms represented on the Council. Thus, Council members do not submit to their current clients legislative proposals
that might affect those clients, nor do they submit such proposals to corresponding counsel in other jurisdictions. This
is not to say that “outsiders” have no input into the development of the DGCL: Council members not uncommonly
receive suggestions for change from clients or co-counsel outside of Delaware, Council members also actively follow
the development of the Model Business Corporation Act,29 and Council members’ own suggestions are often prompted
by problems or issues they have observed in their dealings with clients and co-counsel.30 Regardless of the source of a
proposal, however, Council members consider it important that further deliberation on the proposal proceed without
further input from or influence by persons outside of their own law firms.31
This limited form of insularity on the part of the Council also extends to relations with the Delaware courts.
Delaware’s judges, particularly of late, have publicly expressed their individual views---formed out of their extensive
experience with the corporate cases presented to them---on potentially desirable changes to the DGCL.32 Similarly, and
in view of the small size and close-knit character of the relations among Delaware’s judges and corporate lawyers,
private conversations among members of these two groups on the subject of potential changes to the DGCL have not
been uncommon. Recognizing the importance of the separation of coequal branches of government, however, these
communications are rare, informal and, most importantly, preliminary. The Council does not invite the Delaware
judges to its meetings, nor do the judges seek out an audience at such gatherings. And as is the case with lawyers
outside of Delaware, the Council does not solicit comments from the Delaware judges with respect to the drafting of
potential or proposed legislative initiatives that do not relate to matters of court jurisdiction or administration. There is,
moreover, an equally strong corollary tradition: The Council, as a matter of longstanding policy, consciously tries to

28

Amended and Restated Delaware State Bar Association Bylaws § 10.2(e) (2006), available at
http://www.dsba.org/AssocPubs/PDFs/Bylaws.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
29
Until June 2006, two of the current Council members, as well as two former members (former Delaware Supreme Court Chief
Justice E. Norman Veasey and current Justice Jack B. Jacobs) served on the Committee on Corporate Laws of the Section of
Business Law of the American Bar Association, the committee responsible for the drafting of the Model Business Corporation
Act. See ABA Section of Business Law, at http://www.abanet.org/dch/committee.cfm?com=CL270000 (last modified on June 23,
2006) (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (providing mission of Section on Business Law).
30
Kahan & Rock, supra note 2, at 1600.
31
Aside from the adoption of DGCL section 203, see infra text accompanying note 71, I have observed only one exception to this
approach: When a particularly complex amendment dealing with domestication or transfer of non-Delaware corporations was
under consideration, Council members considering the amendment felt it necessary to confer with practitioners of international tax
law whose expertise was both critical to the proper drafting of the legislation and beyond the knowledge of any of the lawyers in
their firms. That contact, however, was initiated by Council members, not by the outside lawyers.
32
See, e.g., William B. Chandler III & Leo E. Strine, Jr., The New Federalism of the American Corporate Governance System:
Preliminary Reflections of Two Residents of One Small State, 152 U. Pa. L. Rev. 953, 999--1004 (2003) (discussing possible
changes to Delaware laws controlling elections of corporate directors and holding key executives accountable); Leo E. Strine, Jr.,
Toward a True Corporate Republic: A Traditionalist Response to Bebchuk’s Solution for Improving Corporate America, 119
Harv. L. Rev. 1759, 1777-79 (2006) (outlining “initiative that would address the real issues that inspire Bebchuk's and others' calls
for reform while responsibly taking into account the concerns of traditionalists. ”).
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avoid proposing legislation that would directly or even indirectly affect the outcome of litigation pending in the
Delaware courts.33
Before concluding this description of the formation of Delaware’s statutory corporate law, it is important to
dispel any inference that the Council has an entirely free hand in developing the DGCL. At the most superficial level,
the Council’s recommendations must be approved by the full Corporation Law Section (consisting of over 300
members of the Delaware Bar), and by the Executive Committee of the Bar Association, following notice of proposed
changes to the other Sections of the Bar Association.34 These approvals usually follow Council approval in a fairly
routine way, but not always. In 2003, for example, the Council’s proposal to amend DGCL section 220 was
significantly revised in response to objections from the Corporate Counsel Section (which deals largely with issues
pertinent to in-house corporate counsel).35
Far more importantly, however, the Council has always been acutely aware that it must strive to maintain the
trust and confidence of the General Assembly, and avoid legislation that would expose the General Assembly to
criticism for favoring the parochial interests of one corporation or for favoring local businesses over Delaware
corporations headquartered elsewhere. One senior Delaware corporate practitioner has explained as follows the
symbiotic and trust-based relationship between the General Assembly and the Bar Association:
The Delaware General Corporation Law is the great beneficiary of an unwritten compact between the bar and
the state legislature. In broad outline, the terms of the compact recognize that the legislature will call upon the
expertise of the Corporation Law Section of the Delaware State Bar Association to recommend, review and
draft almost all amendments to the statute. Similarly unspoken, but understood, is the obligation of the bar to
leave parochial client interests behind when proposing corporate legislation, to present issues fairly and in an
even-handed fashion, and always to deal candidly and openly with the legislature on matters involving the
corporation law.36
This perceived “obligation . . . to leave parochial client interests behind when proposing corporate legislation” will
undoubtedly be dismissed by some as self-serving, self-deluding, and illusory. There are at least two reasons, however,
to take it seriously. First, the obligation has been recited by Council members quite regularly in and outside of formal
meetings of the Council, enough to suspect that the members act on the obligation if only because they repeatedly
remind themselves of it. Second, and as previously noted, most of the Council members have represented a wide range
of corporate participants---inside directors, outside directors, officers, takeover bidders, dissenting stockholders---and
thus have had clients who simply do not speak with one voice on any aspect of the corporate law. It is just not that hard
to leave client interests at the door when those interests are so diverse that any particular initiative will be attractive to
some clients but unattractive to others.
B.

The Delaware Court of Chancery and the Delaware Supreme Court

33

The rationale for this form of abstention is discussed in Part III, infra.
Delaware State Bar Association Amended and Restated Bylaws, supra note 29, § 10.2(d)--(e).
35
See 2002--2003 Annual Report of the Corporation Law Section to the Delaware State Bar Association (2003) (unpublished, on
file with author).
36
Lewis S. Black, Jr., Why Corporations Choose Delaware 5 (Corporation Service Company, January 1999). This publication has
been printed and distributed extensively by the Division of Corporations of the Delaware Department of State. Mr. Black, who
served on the Council for many years, is a former partner and now of counsel with the Wilmington firm of Morris, Nichols, Arsht
& Tunnell.
34
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In the previous section it was noted that the legislative drafting work of the Council proceeds largely out of
public view.37 The work of the Delaware Court of Chancery and Supreme Court, on the other hand, is presumptively
entirely public.38 Especially in recent years, Delaware’s judges (including recently retired judges) have become prolific
authors on corporate law matters.39 The Delaware judges also participate conferences throughout the world on the
subject of corporate law, as speakers, panelists and audience members. They interact at these gatherings with lawyers
(domestic and foreign, litigation and transactional, plaintiff and defense), as well as other judges, investment bankers,
institutional shareholder representatives, and of course, academics.40 It is not surprising, therefore, that there has been
much more academic analysis of the Delaware judiciary than of the Council.41
The basic features of the Delaware corporate judicial system are thus well known. It relies on a specialized trial
court (the Court of Chancery) that sits without a jury and bars punitive damages awards.42 Judges are appointed, rather
than elected, through a largely nonpolitical process backed up by a requirement of bipartisan representation on the
court.43 A sufficiently uncrowded docket permits urgent cases to be resolved expeditiously, sometimes amazingly so.44
37

See supra notes 30--32 and accompanying text. Of course, the General Assembly itself meets in public, but the proceedings of
its houses and of its committees are not published; there are no written committee reports; and the only elaboration on its
amendments to the DGCL is in the form of written synopses (drafted by the Council) that appear at the end of bills.
38
See, e.g., Stone v. Ritter, No. 1570-N, 2005 Del. Ch. LEXIS 146, at *5 (Del. Ch. Sept. 26, 2005).
39
Kahan & Rock, supra note 2 at 1603 n.117) (assembling enormous list of such publications). Other and more recent articles
include: Jack B. Jacobs, The Uneasy Truce Between Law and Equity in Modern Business Enterprise Jurisprudence, 8 Del. L.
Rev. 1 (2005); Jack B. Jacobs, Implementing Japan’s New Anti-Takeover Defense Guidelines Part I: Some Lessons From
Delaware’s Experience in Crafting “Fair” Takeover Rules, 2 N.Y.U. J. L. & Bus. 323 (2006); E. Norman Veasey & Christine T.
Di Guglielmo, What Happened in Delaware Corporate Law and Governance from 1992--2004? A Retrospective on Some Key
Developments, 153 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1399 (2005). Delaware’s judges also frequently contribute to academic literature through their
comments on articles by law professors and other commentators. E.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Abolishing Veil Piercing, 26 J.
Corp. L. 479 (2001); Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, The Myth of State Competition in Corporate Law, 55 Stan. L. Rev. 679
(2002); Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, Price Discrimination in the Market for Corporate Law, 86 Cornell L. Rev. 1205 (2001);
Fred S. McChesney, “Proper Purpose,” Fiduciary Duties, and Shareholder-Raider Access to Corporate Information, 68 U. Cin. L.
Rev. 1199 (2000); John L. Reed & Matt Neiderman, "Good Faith" and the Ability of Directors to Assert § 102(b)(7) of the
Delaware General Corporation Law as a Defense to Claims Alleging Abdication, Lack of Oversight, and Similar Breaches of
Fiduciary Duty, 29 Del. J. Corp. L. 111 (2004).
40
Appendix A to this Essay sets forth an incomplete---but nonetheless imposing---list of such public engagements by some of the
members of the Delaware Supreme Court and the Court of Chancery.
41
See, e.g., Fisch, supra note 2; Lyman Johnson, The Delaware Judiciary and the Meaning of Corporate Life and Corporate Law,
68 Tex. L. Rev. 865 (1990); Kahan & Rock, supra note 2 at 1602--04.
42
See Beals v. Wash. Int’l, Inc., 386 A.2d 1156, 1159 (Del. Ch. 1978); Drexler et al., supra note 8, § 2.01, at 1-2; Donald J.
Wolfe, Jr. & Michael A. Pittenger, Corporate and Commercial Practice in the Delaware Court of Chancery § 2.5 (2000).
43
Veasey & Di Gugliemo, supra note 399, at 1402.
44
A notable example is the schedule on which the dispute over the Hewlett-Packard stockholder vote on the merger with Compaq
was resolved. In its April 30, 2002 opinion resolving the dispute after trial, the court recited the following procedural history:
This action was filed just over a month ago, on March 28, 2002. HP moved to dismiss the complaint on April 1. After
oral argument on April 7, that motion was denied on April 8. The parties conducted discovery on an expedited basis and a
three-day trial was held from April 23 to April 25. Six witnesses testified at trial and several other witnesses gave
deposition testimony. The parties submitted post-trial briefs on April 27. Having considered the testimony and reviewed
these filings, together with more than 500 trial exhibits, I now set forth my findings of facts and conclusions of law.
Hewlett v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 2002 Del. Ch. LEXIS 35, at *3 (Del. Ch. Apr. 30, 2002) (footnotes omitted). In short, in barely
over a month, the court had disposed of both a motion to dismiss the complaint and a trial on the merits.
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Finally, the judges have a deep appreciation of the value of both clear formal rules and the superficially contrary
discretion to remedy inequitable conduct.45
It is this last feature that has drawn the most academic attention. Some scholars have expressed frustration with
a system in which foundational rules emerge (or later metamorphose) out of discrete, fact-bound rulings, rather than
from a coherent deliberative process that values clarity and predictability over equity.46 Some of these critics see a
rent-seeking motivation, deliberate or not, in the prevailing judicial attitude and in the central role played by the courts
in developing Delaware corporate law. They see a devotion to an indeterminacy that aggrandizes the courts’ role and
enriches those (especially the Delaware lawyers) who handle the necessary litigation, at the expense of corporations
and their stockholders and customers who bear the costs of uncertainty and litigation.47
This is a good story to the extent one believes that greater codification would substantially reduce uncertainty
and its costs, and that those who eschew such codification and promote indeterminacy impose deadweight costs upon
society. Not all are convinced, however, that efforts aimed at codification would in fact be more efficient.48 For
present purposes, it is neither necessary nor possible to resolve that empirically elusive issue; rather, the question is
how the natives perceive their own role and motivation. On this point, Delaware’s judges appear sincere and
unanimous. In the words of Vice Chancellor Leo Strine:
By its very nature, equitable review is situationally-specific and proceeds in the common law fashion. The case
at hand is decided and the law is thereby evolved incrementally. Although that can lead to what some scholars
like to call indeterminancy---i.e., some residual uncertainty---it also allows space for the judiciary to pull back
in future cases if a prior decision turns out, in the wake of experience, to have been unwise.49
Other Delaware judges likewise defend a regime in which indeterminacy is systemic,50 even as they struggle to keep
equitable discretion from overrunning statutory or contractual rules that have ostensibly predictable content.51 In any
event, the ongoing struggle to apply the law and concurrently do equity is what Delaware’s corporate law judges do.
45

See, e.g., Jacobs, supra note 39, at 15.
See Kamar, supra note 2, at 1912--23.
47
Id. at 1939--40; see also Douglas M. Branson, Indeterminacy: The Final Ingredient in an Interest Group Analysis of Corporate
Law, 43 Vand. L. Rev. 85, 112 (1990) (“An explanation for Delaware's surprisingly proshareholder output of decisions is that a
not uninvisible hand operates to serve the special interest groups that make up the Delaware establishment, including the
shareholder and plaintiffs' counsel side that this establishment must have.”); William J. Carney, The Production of Corporate Law,
71 S. Cal. L. Rev. 715, 727 (1998) (“Delaware increases litigation costs through the adoption of open legal standards (rather than
bright-line property rules).”); John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future of Corporate Federalism: State Competition and the New Trend
Toward De Facto Federal Minimum Standards, 8 Cardozo L. Rev. 759, 762--66 (1987).
48
Fisch, supra note 2, at 1083--85; Veasey & Di Gugliemo, supra note 39, at 1412--13.; see also Edward B. Rock, Saints and
Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law Work?, 44 UCLA L. Rev. 1009, 1017 (1997) (claiming that process leading to
precise standards through narratives cannot be reduced to rules or algorithms); Sean J. Griffith & Myron T. Steele, On Corporate
Law Federalism: Threatening the Thaumatrope, 61 Bus. Law. 1 (2005) (advocating state law flexibility as advantage over largely
mandatory federal corporate lawmaking).
49
Strine, Delaware Way, supra note 199, at 683.
50
Jacobs, supra note 399, at 15; Veasey & Di Gugliemo, supra note 399, at 1412--13.
51
See, e.g., Jacobs, supra note 399, at 10--15 (explaining that equitable discretion “should be reserved for those instances that
threaten the fabric of the law, or which by an improper manipulation of the law, would deprive a person of a clear right” (quoting
Ala. By-Products v. Neal, 588 A.2d 255, 258 n.1 (Del. 1991))); In re Pure Res., Inc. S’holders Litig., 808 A.2d 421, 434 (Del. Ch.
2002) (“[J]udges must supplement the broadly enabling features of statutory corporation law with equitable principles sufficient to
46
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II.

An Inventory of Outside Explanations of the Making of Delaware Corporate Law

Not long after Delaware substantially revised its General Corporation Law in 1967, its role in establishing rules
of corporate governance captured the attention of outside observers. This Part reviews some of the more significant
outside observations of Delaware’s corporate lawmaking activity. The purpose of this review is not to pick a winner
whose work appeals to a Delaware native as the most accurate assessment. Nor is the purpose of this Part, or even this
Essay, to espouse normative judgments about the quality of Delaware’s corporate lawmaking. The goal for now is
simply to set out a brief inventory of the outside assessments, lacing it with a little color commentary from time to time
to note a few points of agreement, disagreement, or elaboration.

A.

The Earliest Explorer and the Race to the Bottom

The first notable explorer of the Delaware incorporation phenomenon, Professor William Cary, took a dim view
of the natives.52 His core assessment was that Delaware is “a pygmy among the 50 states [that] prescribes, interprets,
and indeed denigrates national corporate policy as an incentive to encourage incorporation within its borders, thereby
increasing its revenue.”53 As an antidote to Delaware’s leadership of a “race to the bottom,”54 what Cary argued for
was not federal incorporation (which he considered “politically unrealistic” 55), but the enactment of federal minimum
standards of corporate conduct uniformly applicable to publicly held corporations.56
Many of Cary’s observations were accurate. He was certainly correct in describing full-fledged federal
incorporation as politically unrealistic; there has never been any substantial political coalition of support for such a
measure. Cary also accurately describes modern corporation laws (largely patterned after the DGCL) as “enabling
acts” rather than as regulatory systems.57 He was correct in observing that the corporate franchise tax and the indirect
benefits of incorporation command the attention of Delaware’s corporate lawmakers, who are therefore powerfully
motivated to preserve those benefits.58 And he was undoubtedly responsible in some immeasurable way for Delaware
court opinions that emerged after his article was published and that could fairly be viewed as an attempt to refute his
various theses.59
protect against abuse and unfairness, but not so rigid as to stifle useful transactions that could increase the shareholder and societal
wealth generated by the corporate form.”).
52
See Cary, supra note 2, at 672--86.
53
Id. at 701.
54
Id. at 666.
55
Id. at 700.
56
Id. at 701--02.
57
Id. at 666.
58
See Fischel, supra note 2, at 915--16; Cary, supra note 2, at 668-669.
59
For example, Cary claimed that Delaware courts did not impose any fiduciary duty upon directors or officers in buying stock
from minority stockholders. Id. at 672 (citing Mansfield Hardwood Lumber Co. v. Johnson, 268 F.2d 317 (5th Cir. 1959)). It is
not at all clear that this assertion was correct when made. See Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Calling Off the Lynch Mob: The
Corporate Director’s Fiduciary Disclosure Duty, 49 Vand. L. Rev. 1087, 1115--20 (1996). In any event, the Delaware Supreme
Court, within just a few years after Cary’s article was published, resoundingly asserted the existence of a fiduciary duty of
disclosure associated with purchases of stock from minority stockholders. Id. at 1120--21 (discussing Lynch v. Vickers Energy
Corp., 383 A.2d 278 (Del. 1977)). Similarly, Cary’s critique of Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 182 A.2d 328 (Del. 1962),
Cary, supra note 2, at 683--84, was embraced by Chancellor Allen in his well-known opinion in In re Caremark Int’l Inc.

- -

11

Cary’s arguments, of course, have been roundly criticized, from the perspectives of both law and economics,60
and there is little to be gained by taking even more shots at the work of a thoughtful scholar who can no longer defend
his work. One wonders, in fact, whether Cary would tell the same story today in comparing Delaware corporate law
with the law of other states.61 It is a sufficient response to Cary at this point, in any event, to assert merely that today’s
drafters of the DGCL do not devote an iota of conscious effort to make that statute more friendly to management and
less protective of stockholders. To the contrary, as explained below, we favor a much more conservative approach that
seeks to maintain whatever balance currently exists, and we are distinctly uncomfortable with any change that alters
that balance in either direction.62
B.

The Second Wave of Exploration: The Race to the Top

The principal academic response to Cary came in the decade that followed publication of his “Reflections upon
Delaware.” In published remarks that almost certainly set the record for the highest ratio of influence to footnotes,
Judge Ralph K. Winter argued that “[a]s long as we assume that there is real competition to make money through
attracting corporate charters, Delaware will not tilt toward management.”63 To the contrary, Winter posited that to
secure its happy place in the competition for corporate charters, Delaware would lead a “race to the top.”64 Extending
Judge Winter’s work, Professor Daniel Fischel published a more extensive articulation of the same basic point, noting,
among other things, empirical evidence refuting the existence of the discount on Delaware stocks that one would
predict if it were truly the leading purveyor of investor abuse.65 Professor Roberta Romano, perhaps the most
consistent and forceful advocate of the “race to the top” perspective, has added her own empirical analysis of
reincorporations in support of this perspective.66

Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 970--71 (Del. Ch. 1996), in which the Chancellor found a duty on the part of directors to install
internal control systems to prevent violations of law---precisely the duty that Cary contended the Graham court should have
imposed.
60
See, e.g., S. Samuel Arsht, Reply to Professor Cary, 31 Bus. Law. 1113, 1114--17 (1976) (questioning accuracy of Cary’s
examination of Delaware case law); Fischel, supra note 2, at 920--21 (questioning economic premises of “race to the bottom”
story).
61
It is well known that Delaware has resisted adopting legislation that is nearly as protective of management in takeovers as
legislation adopted in other states. See, e.g., 15 Pa. Cons. Stats. Ann. § 1715 (West 1995) (permitting director consideration of
interests of constituencies other than shareholders, providing that “the fiduciary duty of directors shall not be deemed to require
them . . . to redeem any . . . rights plan,” and presuming validity of disinterested director action relating to or affecting acquisition
or potential or proposed acquisition of control). Similarly, Delaware courts have not embraced doctrines as restrictive of minority
stockholder rights in freeze-out mergers as those adopted in some other jurisdictions---for example, Ohio’s strong judicial
articulation of appraisal exclusivity, announced in Armstrong v. Marathon Oil Co., 513 N.E.2d 776, 798 (Ohio 1987), and applied
to an Ohio corporation in Abbey v. E.W. Scripps Co., 1995 Del. Ch. LEXIS 94 (Del. Ch. Aug. 9, 1995)).
62
See infra Part III.
63
Ralph Winter, Private Goals and Competition Among State Legal Systems, 6 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 127, 128 (1982). The
article contains four footnotes (including the one identifying the author), and cites just two articles, including the Cary article.
64
Id. at 128--29 (“As long as Delaware is competing . . . [t]here will be a race to establish the optimal corporation code . . . .”).
65
Fischel, supra note 2, at 920--21.
66
See, e.g., Roberta Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J.L. Econ. & Org. 225, 265--73
(1985) (demonstrating empirically that Delaware reincorporation does not adversely affect stock price); Roberta Romano, The
Genius of American Corporate Law 19--24 (1993) (demonstrating empirically that Delaware statutes limiting directors’ personal
liability for damages in shareholder suits did not adversely affect stock prices).
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None of these “race to the top” advocates, however, elaborated on precisely how Delaware’s legislators, judges,
and lawyers did or would actually decide how to carry out the leadership of the “race to the top.” Moreover, their
prediction of a “race to the top” in the development of corporate law from its inception presupposed “real competition.”
That presupposition, of course, has had its detractors,67 but the existence of genuine interstate competition---a “race,” in
other words---was a critical factual premise for both Cary and his “race to the top” antagonists.
This Essay makes no attempt to address definitively or even in any detail the issue of whether and to what
extent a meaningful interstate “race” has occurred or continues to occur. Nor does it stake out a position on whether a
“race,” if one has been occurring, has been aimed at some “top” or “bottom.”68 Viewed from the perspective of a
Delaware native, however, two things can be said about the various “race”/non-“race” theories. First, even if some are
willing to declare that Delaware has “won” the “race,” or has an ostensibly insurmountable lead,69 no one in Delaware
is willing to play hare while some other state tortoise gains ground. If some innovation in corporate law were to
emerge in another jurisdiction and prove to be widely popular, there is no doubt that Delaware would carefully consider
it. Whether Delaware would actually adopt it would depend on other considerations, but there is no question that
Delaware’s policymakers would be strongly motivated to adopt it in order to maintain its competitive place. Thus, and
to this extent anyway, the “race” remains alive and well.
Second, this “race” motivation of Delaware’s corporate lawmakers certainly does not lead inexorably only
downhill. The classic illustration of both of these points is Delaware’s adoption of its current takeover statute in
1988.70 As has already been observed,71 Delaware’s enactment of its business combination moratorium statute (DGCL
section 203) occurred in a context with three powerfully salient circumstances: (1) The United States Supreme Court
had recently revitalized the constitutional foundation for state regulation affecting takeovers;72 numerous states had
already adopted antitakeover statutes to take advantage of this recognition of state authority;73 and hostile takeover bids

67

See, e.g., Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 2,at 563--85; Kahan & Kamar, supra note 399, at 55.
Nor does this Essay address intrastate competition in corporate lawmaking, which was the subject of Macey and Miller’s wellknown article. Macey & Miller, supra note 2 (analyzing competing interests of Delaware corporate lawyers and Delaware
taxpayers).
69
See Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 2, at 586 (“Delaware faces a very weak threat of a challenge by another state.”); Kamar,
supra note 2, at 1954; Roe, Delaware’s Competition, supra note 2, at 590. As Frank Balotti pointed out in commenting on this
paper, interstate “racing” may be much more vibrant in niche areas (formation of real estate investment trusts or mutual funds, for
example) than in the case of public companies in general. See, e.g., Crossing the Line, Real Estate Portfolio, Jan./Feb. 2002,
available at http://www.nareit.com/portfoliomag/02janfeb/policy.shtml (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (featuring
presentations by James J. Hanks, Jr. of Maryland and Ellisa Opstbaum Habbart of Delaware outlining advantages of REIT
formation in their respective states).
70
Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 203 (1988).
71
See e.g., Roe, Delaware’s Competition, supra note 2,at 630--31.
72
See CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69 (1987).
73
Professor Romano has thoroughly documented the extraordinarily rapid spread of state antitakeover statutes and the political
and economic conditions that fueled that phenomenon. See Roberta Romano, The Political Economy of Takeover Statutes, 73 Va.
L. Rev. 111, 189 (1987) (“[In contrast to Delaware] the regulation of corporations at the state level is not an unmitigated good.
States in which there are not many major corporations . . . are more susceptible to the pressure of a specific target firm and hence
are more likely to pass takeover regulations . . . .”).
68
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were approaching then-record levels.74 Quite simply, Delaware was in no position not to respond to the legislation in
other states---and grudgingly or not, the “race” was definitely on.75
But as the Delaware takeover statute demonstrates, and contrary to what the Cary “race to the bottom” thesis
would have predicted, “race” pressures from other states did not lead to the adoption of a statute that was an even more
formidable deterrent to hostile takeovers than the versions that other states had adopted. To the contrary, the Delaware
takeover statute is generally recognized as at worst mild, and perhaps even irrelevant, in its effect on hostile
takeovers,76 and has had a far greater negative impact on friendly deals, as the limited case law demonstrates.77 One
could explain the mildness of Delaware’s response as an act of enlightened self-interest aimed at winning a “race to the
top.” Or, one could seek out some more mundane, even cynical, explanation---which brings us to the next major
visitor’s exploration of the Delaware corporate lawmaking phenomenon.
C.

The Pygmy in Fear of the Federal Giant

Great scientific advances proceed from tension between prevailing theories and the facts.78 Faced with
evidence that the interstate competition for corporate chartering is relatively weak,79 one could no longer confidently
accept the Winter/Fischel/Romano theory that Delaware’s corporate law was successful because it was the best product
on the market. By the same token, however, one could not help but observe that Cary’s fears of states outbidding each
other to pander to corporate managers at the expense of investors were far from realized, and were contradicted by the
apparent trajectory of Delaware corporate law.
Setting out upon this sea of academic tension, Mark Roe explored the Delaware phenomenon yet again. In his
recent articles on the subject, he makes the pathbreaking observation---like all great scientific theories, inspiring in its
simplicity yet exhaustive in its comprehension of the facts---that whatever interstate “racing” has occurred necessarily
takes place within the powerful gravitational pull of actual and inchoate exercises of federal regulatory authority.80
Simply put, if Delaware and the other states compete at all for corporate chartering business, they do so within the
limits of what federal authorities will tolerate.

74

See D. Gordon Smith & Cynthia A. Williams, Cases and Materials on Business Organizations: Cases, Problems and Case
Studies 682 (2003) (describing 1988 as “the peak year for hostile takeovers in the 1980s”).
75
Roe, Delaware’s Competition, supra note 2, at 630--31.
76
See, e.g., id. at 625 (describing Delaware takeover statute as “mild”). For the proposition that DGCL section 203 is largely
irrelevant in deterring hostile bids, one merely has to ponder the extent of its impact in a regime in which flip-in shareholder rights
plans, or poison pills, are allowed. If for all practical purposes a hostile bid can be pursued only in conjunction with an effort to
unseat the incumbent directors, that same effort would also enable the bidder to elect a board willing to approve the acquisition
and thereby render section 203’s moratorium effect inapplicable. Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 203(a)(1) (1988) (“A corporation shall
not engage in any business combination with any interested stockholder for a period of 3 years following the time that such
stockholder became an interested stockholder, unless: (1) Prior to such time the board of directors of the corporation approved . . .
the transaction which resulted in the stockholder becoming an interested stockholder; . . . .”).
77
In re Digex Inc. S’holders Litig., 789 A.2d 1176 (Del. Ch. 2001); Siegman v. Columbia Pictures Entm’t, Inc., 576 A.2d 625
(Del. Ch. 1989); see also Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914 (Del. 2003) (explaining that but for section 203,
board approval of the voting agreements with controlling stockholders would not have been necessary and would have been even
less clear that directors breached their fiduciary duties in approving “force the vote” merger agreement).
78
Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions 52--53 (2d ed. 1970) (explaining how scientific paradigms shift).
79
See Kahan & Kamar, supra note 399, at 684--86..
80
E.g., Roe, Delaware’s Competition, supra note 2, at 591--93.
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In telling this story, Roe becomes a worthy successor to Cary: While Roe does not advocate the Congressional
enactment of minimum corporate standards, let alone federal incorporation, he suggests in effect that such formal
action is unnecessary, because the mere threat of it is enough to keep Delaware from unduly degrading corporate law at
the expense of investors.81 As he suggests, and to paraphrase the well-known bumper sticker, minimum federal
standards happen: They have happened through direct legislation,82 they have happened through SEC rulemaking,83
they have happened through stock exchange corporate governance listing standards,84 and they have happened through
federal court application of disclosure rules that enforce what are in substance duties of care.85 Delaware lawmakers
know all this, he says,86 and moderation in Delaware corporate law is therefore simply the observed result of
lawmakers being tugged in competing directions by the “race to the bottom” motivation and by a desire to avoid even
further federal incursion into the domain of state corporate law.87
As a participant in Delaware corporate lawmaking, and having enjoyed the approbation of those who see
Delaware corporate law as the evolutionary survivor of the fittest in the corporate chartering competition, I would
surely like to say that Roe has it all wrong. But he doesn’t. At the most basic level, Roe is absolutely right: The
federal government could, in a variety of ways, expand its role in establishing the rules of corporate law, and there is
little if anything that we in Delaware could do about it. All we can do is hope that paroxysms of populist pressure for
such federal intervention are few and far between, and try not to make law that will induce such paroxysms, so that the
not unimportant role of Delaware’s courts and legislature in the making of corporate law can continue to be played and
so that our state can continue to enjoy the resulting benefits.
Without diminishing my admiration for Roe’s insights, however, it must be noted that my agreement with them
is not complete. More precisely, I see a gap in them: While they may accurately explain why Delaware refrains from
lawmaking behavior that would push too many populist buttons, Roe’s insights are incomplete in that they do not
explain why Delaware does what it does within the considerable range of motion allotted to it. Likewise, they do not
fully explain why Delaware has passed up the opportunity to make laws that might head off federalization threats.
Delaware’s response to Sarbanes-Oxley is illustrative. In the wake of that statutory eruption from Washington,
with the scent of corporate scandal still lingering and with many institutional investor representatives vigorously

81

See id. at 590 (“Delaware players are conscious that the federal government, even if silent, could step in if roused.”).
See id. at 610--11 (citing Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C.A. §§ 78a-78mm (2003) (noting that shareholder voting, “probably the single most important internal corporate affair,” is
subject to extensive SEC regulation)).
83
See id. at 615--17 (describing promulgation of SEC Rule 13e-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-3 (2003), regulating going private
transactions).
84
See, e.g., New York Stock Exchange Listed Company Manual ¶¶ 303A.01--303A.10, available at
http://www.nyse.com/Frameset.html?displayPage=/listed/1022221393251.html (last modified 2004) (on file with the Columbia
Law Review) [hereinafter New York Stock Exchange Manual] (requiring, for instance, that listed companies have audit
committees and majority of independent directors) (“Much federal securities litigation today is still corporate governance
litigation, and it often has a scope and depth as great as that of state litigation.”)).
85
See Roe, Delaware’s Competition, supra note 2, at 615 (citing Robert B. Thompson & Hillary A. Sale, Securities Fraud as
Corporate Governance: Reflections Upon Federalism, 56 Vand. L. Rev. 859 (2003)).
86
Id. at 642.
87
See id. at 639--40 (contending that Delaware’s “two main adversaries”---other states and federal authorities---“have differing
motivations, which can lead [Delaware] to differing substantive results”).
82
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seeking further federal intervention in the form of control of the election of public company directors,88 one would have
thought that the federal gravitational pull on Delaware would be at its strongest, or nearly so, and that Delaware would
respond preemptively by seeking to pursue legislative initiatives that might have blunted the federal momentum, with a
minimum of risk of state competition cost. It didn’t, even though many possibilities were actively considered,
including a proposal to require corporations to reimburse some or all of the solicitation expenses of dissident proxy
contestants who achieve at least thirty-five percent of the vote in an election.89 Instead, the Council labored and in
2003 brought forth two amendments that pale in significance relative to Sarbanes-Oxley: (i) a clarification of the
circumstances in which stockholders would be entitled to inspect records held by corporate subsidiaries,90 and (ii) a
provision extending personal jurisdiction to top corporate officers, where such jurisdiction had been limited to
directors.91
88

Specifically, they sought to secure such control through the adoption of SEC rules that would require corporations to include, at
the corporation’s expense, director nominees submitted by stockholders. See, e.g., AFL-CIO, Request for Rulemaking to Permit
Shareholder-Nominated Director Candidates to Appear in Corporate Proxy Statements and Proxy Cards (May 15, 2003), available
at http://www.sec.gov/rules/petitions/petn4-491.htm (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (petitioning SEC “to adopt
comprehensive new rules that will give shareholders equal access to the proxy for their director nominees”). This “direct access”
movement culminated in the proposal by the SEC in late 2003 of a new Rule 14a-11, which would have provided for such proxy
statement inclusion of stockholder nominees in limited circumstances. Security Holder Director Nominations, Exchange Act
Release No. 34-48626, 68 Fed. Reg. 60,783 (proposed Oct. 14, 2003). Barely over a year later, the proposal had come to be
widely viewed as stillborn. See Stephen Labaton, S.E.C. Rebuffs Investors on Board Votes, N.Y. Times, Feb. 8, 2005, at C2
(reporting that SEC’s proposed direct access rule appears “dead”).
89
See Strine, supra note 33, at 1778 (proposing triennial election regime where companies would reimburse “reasonable
solicitation costs” of qualified contestant who won at least thirty-five percent of votes); Joann S. Lublin, Corporate Funding for
Shareholder Activism?, Wall St. J., July 3, 2006, at B3 (discussing Strine’s proposal).
90
Act of June 30, 2003, c. 84, secs. 5--8, § 220(a)--(d), 2003-2 Del. Code Ann. Adv. Legis. Serv. 402, 403--405 (LexisNexis)
(amending Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 220 (2006) to permit inspection of subsidiary records if parent controls subsidiary and either
possesses records itself or could obtain them through exercise of its control over subsidiary). In proposing this amendment, the
drafters were sensitive to the fact that many of the accounting irregularities at Enron occurred at the level of direct or indirect
subsidiaries. See Report of Investigation by the Special Investigative Committee of the Board of Directors of Enron Corp. 36-39
(2002), available at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/enron/sicreport/sicreport020102.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law
Review) (emphasizing importance of special purpose entities used by Enron to preserve off-balance sheet treatment of financing) .
According to Kahan & Rock, the Delaware Supreme Court has applied new section 220 with “discomfort” or “even hostility.”
Kahan & Rock, supra note 2, at 1594-95 (citing Weinstein Enters., Inc. v. Orloff, 870 A.2d 499, 511 (Del. 2005)). I did not find
the court’s treatment of new section 220 so hostile: It simply emphasizes that the duty to produce subsidiary documents rests not
just on potential control through share ownership, but on actual operational control---control that was found lacking in the case at
hand due to the meaningful independence of the special committee of the subsidiary’s board, to which the power over the matter
had been delegated, and which rejected the parent’s request for the records out of concern that divulgence of such information
would cause the subsidiary to suffer from a competitive disadvantage. Weinstein Enters., 870 A.2d at 505.
91
Act of June 30, 2003, c. 83, 2003-2 Del. Code Ann. Adv. Legis. Serv. 400 (LexisNexis) (amending Del. Code Ann. tit. 10,
§ 3114 (1999)). Described as a “response to failures in corporate governance that received widespread publicity in recent years,”
this extension of personal jurisdiction over senior corporate officers was also motivated in part by the fact that such officers’
service as directors (thereby subjecting them to service of process in Delaware under the preexisting statute) was becoming
increasingly less common as board composition increasingly tilted toward outside director majorities. Lewis S. Black, Jr. &
Frederick H. Alexander, Analysis of the 2003 Amendments to the Delaware General Corporation Law 7 (2003); see also Del.
Dep’t of State, Div. of Corps., General Assembly Approves 2003 Amendments to Corporate Laws (June 30, 2003), at
http://www.state.de.us/corp/2003amends.shtml (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (“Because of enhanced requirements for
independent director representation, it is likely that fewer senior officers will also serve as directors. Therefore, had section 3114
not been amended, the ability to obtain personal jurisdiction in Delaware over some of the most significant participants in
corporate governance would have been impaired.”).
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Roe would direct our attention, however, to the judicial front, rather than the legislative front in evaluating
Delaware’s moves in response to Sarbanes-Oxley: He suggests that the Delaware courts’ response was a series of cases
attacking executive compensation and otherwise favoring shareholder plaintiffs.92 I suspect that he would contend that
this judicial response was just enough of a push on the tiller to avert the need for a more aggressive legislative change
of course. With that contention, however, Roe would be entering into the realm of speculating that the motives of
Delaware’s judges are evidenced only by the results they reach, and not by the analysis in their opinions that attempts
to supply a coherent body of developing precedent through a common law approach to lawmaking.93
I resist entering this realm in which the natives’ moves are all explained as calculatingly self-protective. Before
attempting to supply an alternative frame of reference, I turn to one more wave of exploration.
D.

The Latest Explorers: Symbiotic Federalism

Marcel Kahan and Ed Rock are the latest explorers of the Delaware lawmaking scene. Like Roe, they exhibit a
knowledge of and sensitivity to the natives that comes in no small part from their efforts to communicate directly with
the participants in the Delaware lawmaking process. Kahan and Rock transcend Roe and the earlier explorers,
however, in attempting to focus on the jurisprudential outlook of Delaware’s corporate lawmakers.
Specifically, Kahan and Rock suggest that Delaware adheres to a “classical or 19th century common law model
of lawmaking.”94 They describe a system that is apolitical, technocratic, and incremental, in which judge-made law,
made case by case, predominates over legislative control.95 The result, they say, is a symbiotic relationship between
Delaware and the federal regulators: Federal intervention allows Delaware to avoid the burdens of embracing a
regulatory scheme that would require enforcement resources that Delaware simply cannot command, and leaves
Delaware free from having to make controversial political decisions that its small size would not permit it to make with
any broad national stamp of legitimacy.96
The Kahan/Rock assessment nicely explains some things that Roe and others do not, particularly the otherwise
puzzling lack of response to Sarbanes-Oxley and to the pressures that prompted that political event. Delaware is slow,
they say, because Delaware embraces a “traditional, reactive model of judge-centered lawmaking.”97 The Kahan/Rock
assessment also appeals to me as a Delaware native because it begins to acknowledge that the Delaware participants
92

Roe, Delaware’s Competition, supra note 2, at 643 (citing In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 825 A.2d 275 (Del. Ch.
2003)). However, Roe does acknowledge that:
The court's change in direction may indicate no more than that the shareholders' complaint was better drafted the second
time around. Or the change could parallel Delaware's Singer shift after federal action: after Delaware had dismissed the
first Disney complaint, Congress passed Sarbanes-Oxley, in the summer of 2002. The difficulty here is to sort out not so
much whether Delaware shifted, but whether its abrupt shift was due primarily to the federal gravitational pull, to the
dynamics of the litigation, or to the state's direct perception of the underlying corporate problems.
Id. at 643 n.11.
93
It should be noted, as Roe did, id., that the Delaware Supreme Court’s opinion remanding the Disney/Ovitz derivative litigation
for further proceedings was issued in 2000, well before Enron, WorldCom, and Sarbanes-Oxley focused public attention on
corporate misconduct. See Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000).
94
Kahan & Rock, supra note 2, at 1576.
95
Id. at 1611--15.
96
Id. at 1620--21.
97
Id. at 1618.
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have some guiding jurisprudential conceptions rather than simply jerking to the tugs of competing external political
pressures.98 That acknowledgement, in fact, is the springboard for the balance of this Essay.
III.

The Policy Motivations of Delaware Corporate Law

The core thesis of this Essay is that interstate competition and fending off federal incursion are only significant at
the margins in Delaware corporate lawmaking, and that they rarely have salience for the participants in the lawmaking
process, either in evaluating potential amendments to the DGCL or in deciding individual cases. A full account of that
process can only be complete if it includes an inventory of the considerations that do have salience, day in and day out,
as Delaware corporate law is made. To have salience in this sense means that a consideration is invoked or recognized
in the lawmaking process, and that its invocation or recognition influences the shaping of the law. With that standard
in mind, I turn in this Part to an inventory of the considerations that I have found to be most visible and influential in
shaping Delaware corporate lawmaking. I conclude with the suggestion that these considerations will continue to
affect that lawmaking process and will guide and limit Delaware’s collective behavior regardless of what Congress or
other states do.
A.

The Principle of Conservatism

Looking back over the forty years since the landmark 1967 general revision of the Delaware General
Corporation Law, one of course observes many statutory changes. What appears on further reflection, however, is just
how few of those changes have involved any dramatic effect on the governance of publicly held corporations. Many of
the statutory changes have been technical, and very few have attracted any academic attention.99
Delaware lawyers and judges consistently and consciously articulate reasons for this high degree of stability.
Most prominent is a pervasive belief that the system of corporate law supplied by Delaware has worked pretty well, and
that change should not be made unless it is apparent that there will be a significant benefit from it without any
countervailing disruption.100 In all of the Council meetings I have attended, this caution is the heuristic that is far and
away the most commonly invoked in considering potential changes to the corporation law.
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If I have any quarrel with Kahan and Rock, it is with their effort to paint a picture of judicial superiority in the lawmaking
process. It is certainly true, as they say, that Delaware corporate law is “noteworthy” in the prominence accorded to judge-made
law, relative to legislation. Id. at 1591. As I suggest below, however, I believe that Kahan and Rock underestimate the extent to
which the Council and the General Assembly seek to limit or undo judicial decisions. More importantly, the prominent place
accorded to judicial determinations in the making of Delaware corporate law is not merely the judges’ choice; simply by virtue of
the way the DGCL is drafted, and by virtue of what that statute does not contain, the critical role of the judiciary frequently results
from a legislative preference for common law development. See infra text accompanying notes 123--124.
99
Kahan & Rock, as well as Cary, remark on this dearth of “interesting” or “significant” legislation. Kahan & Rock, supra note 2,
at 1600--01; William J. Carney & George B. Shepherd, The Mystery of Delaware Law’s Success 43 (unpublished manuscript
dated Aug. 9, 2006, on file with author) (amendments to DGCL from 1992 to 2006 “Error! Main Document Only.are quite
modest, and have not led to radical changes in corporate practice.”). Nonetheless, and like most people, I suspect, I tend to
overestimate the importance of what I do, so I see some considerable degree of practical significance in all of the DGCL
amendments the Council has approved. Indeed, as I am about to explain, I find it unlikely that the DGCL would be amended in
the absence of some strong practical reason to do so.
100
See, e.g., Broz v. Cellular Info. Sys., Inc., 673 A.2d 148, 159 (Del. 1996) (“[C]ertainty and predictability are values to be
promoted in our corporation law.”).
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Many plausible legislative initiatives have been aborted, or never even explored in the first place, as a result of
this “first do no harm” conservatism. The treatment of the substantive scope of bylaws provides a good illustration of
this conservatism. It has been widely known for at least ten years that DGCL section 109(b) does a poor job of
defining the extent to which a bylaw may limit the authority of the board of directors as expressed in section 141(a).101
There is a widely divergent range of views on this question.102 Puzzled by the anomaly of such uncertainty in a body of
law widely admired for its depth, students have asked me why the Delaware statute has not been amended to clarify the
substantive scope of bylaws. The fact that such legislation has not been developed has obviously not been
unintentional. Any attempt to provide such clarification would be devilishly difficult and could easily cause even more
confusion than it might cure. In this instance, then, the Delaware legislative process has followed a common law
approach, waiting to see how specific cases develop, particularly in the Delaware courts, before determining what (if
any) legislative solution would be useful. One should not expect to see a legislative response on this issue until the
Delaware courts decide at least one case squarely presenting it, and even then, the legislative preference may well be to
let the courts continue to refine the subject.103
Consider also how, as previously discussed, the Delaware corporate statute responded---or more accurately,
failed to respond---to recent pressures to enhance the role of contested elections of directors.104 Perhaps, as was
suggested earlier, contemporaneous judicial decisions blunted the need for a statutory response. Or, in declining to
develop a direct proxy access approach, Delaware was perhaps prescient in foreseeing that the SEC’s direct access
proposal would ultimately founder and cease, at least for a time, to represent a further threat of federal intervention in
corporate governance. No such prediction, however, appears to have been made. In this instance, then, Delaware
appears to have passed up a clear opportunity to steal federal thunder while the storm was still on the horizon. The
more powerful explanation for this reticence is not that Delaware policy makers were confident that the storm would
dissipate; rather, the suggested approaches were simply so radically inconsistent with existing Delaware law that they
were unacceptable.
More recently, and in the face of the apparent demise of the SEC direct proxy access rule proposals, those
seeking a broader role for stockholders in director elections have rallied around the concept that the state law plurality
vote default rule is significantly responsible for claimed lack of director accountability to stockholders. These
individuals have actively urged that the plurality vote default rule be changed to one requiring some kind of majority
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See, e.g., Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Corporate Democracy and Stockholder-Adopted By-Laws: Taking Back the Street?, 73
Tul. L. Rev. 409, 428 n.86 (1998) [hereinafter Hamermesh, Corporate Democracy].
102
See id. (outlining competing viewpoints on role of bylaws in managing power between shareholders and board of directors);
see also Brett H. McDonnell, Shareholder Bylaws, Shareholder Nominations, and Poison Pills, 3 Berkeley Bus. L.J. 205 (2005).
103
Gen. Datacomm Indus., Inc. v. State of Wis. Inv. Bd., 731 A.2d 818, [pincite] (Del. Ch. 1999), raised but did not decide the
question. The judicial reticence reflected in that opinion has not gone unnoticed: Professor Jill Fisch , perceptively identified the
General Datacomm opinion as reflecting a more general reluctance on the part of the Delaware courts to make legal
pronouncements relating to matters of technical conformity with the DGCL and therefore having unforeseeably broad legal
effects. Jill Fisch, Fordham Univ. Sch. of Law, Distinguished Scholar Lecture at the Ruby R. Vale Interschool Moot Court
Competition, Widener University School of Law (Mar. 18, 2004). For a more recent example of such reluctance, see Bebchuk v.
CA, Inc., 2006 Del. Ch. LEXIS 118 (Del. Ch. June 22, 2006) (deferring as unripe claim for declaratory judgment validating
proposed bylaw governing board action on shareholder rights plans).
104
Text at notes 88-91, supra.
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vote, so that an “against” vote would become meaningful and would transform corporate voting from the “symbolic to
the democratic.”105
In this environment, and notably despite the apparent disappearance of any imminent threat of federal
occupation of the particular field, Delaware has adopted legislation, at least in a limited way, but in a manner consistent
with its basic conservative tendency and with other Delaware corporate law policies. The relevant backdrop of the
existing statute is its allowance for private ordering of the director vote requirement, unilaterally by either the directors
or the stockholders, through the adoption of a bylaw.106 In its 2006 amendments to the DGCL, however, the General
Assembly expanded the scope of such private ordering. First, DGCL section 216 has been amended so as deny to the
board of directors any power to repeal a director vote requirement bylaw adopted by the stockholders.107 Second,
recognizing that many Delaware corporations have already effectively embraced majority voting through adoption of
policies requiring directors to offer their resignations when they fail to receive more “for” votes than “against” votes for
their election,108 DGCL section 141 has been amended to clarify that such a resignation can be supplied in advance and
can be made irrevocable and thereby enforceable by the corporation.109 These amendments are quintessentially
conservative; they simply reinforce the existing statutory powers that stockholders and directors can use to define the
vote required for the election of directors. No significant shift of power is contemplated.
The thesis? In predicting the trajectory of future struggle between federal and state governments over the
establishment of corporate governance rules, count on Delaware to look for ways to make changes, if at all, that most
nearly preserve intact the substance and balance reflected in the existing law.
B.

Avoidance of Disruption of Preexisting Commercial Relationships

Closely related (at least in consequence) to Delaware’s general proclivity to avoid change is the Coasean notion
that private commercial relationships are structured around existing laws, and that altering the rule structure midstream
disrupts settled relationships. A legal regime prone to such alteration enhances risk and therefore drives up the cost of
capital.110 This concern has been expressed in Delaware lawmaking in several ways.
For example, it accounts for two very curious and unwieldy statutes. The more recent example is DGCL
section 141(c), which contains two distinct recitations of the framework for action by board committees.111 Subpart (1)
105

Institutional S’holder Servs. Inst. for Corporate Governance, Majority Voting in Director Elections: From the Symbolic to the
Democratic (2005), available at http://www.issproxy.com/pdf/MVwhitepaper.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
(advocating adoption of majority voting requirement for election of directors in lieu of prevailing plurality vote default rule).
106
Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 216(3) (2001).
107
S. 322 § 5, 143d Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Del. 2006) (amending tit. 8, § 216(4)), available at
http://www.legis.state.de.us/LIS/lis143.nsf/vwLegislation/SB+322/$file/legis.html?open (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
108
See, e.g., Claudia H. Allen, Neal, Gerber & Eisenberg LLP, Survey of Majority Voting in Director Elections (2006), available
at http://www.ngelaw.com/files/upload/study_callen_031506.pdf (surveying Delaware corporations that adopted majority vote
bylaws or policies) (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
109
S. 322 § 3 (amending tit. 8, § 141(b)).
110
To be sure, there is no longer any general belief that such preexisting expectations and rights are constitutionally protected
against legislative alteration. Cf. tit. 8, § 394 (providing that DGCL may be amended). The lack of constitutional protection,
however, does not mean that legislative policy should not strive to provide similar protection.
111
Compare id. § 141(c)(1) (“[U]nless the resolution, bylaws or certificate of incorporation expressly so provides, no such
committee shall have the power or authority to . . . authorize the issuance of stock.”), with id. § 141(c)(2) (containing no such
limitation).
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of section 141(c), which was the version of section 141(c) in force as of 1996, does not generally permit the board to
delegate to a committee the power to set the terms of and issue capital stock. Subsection (2), however, permits such a
delegation by the board. In adding subsection (2), it was recognized that particularly in closely held firms, planners
may have relied on the limitation in section 141(c) that would preclude a board, by vote of a mere majority of a quorum
of directors, from creating a committee that would have the power to issue stock and thereby alter the corporation’s
capital and control structure.112 In order to protect those commercial expectations, section 141(c) was amended so that
only newly incorporated corporations would be automatically subject to the provision expanding board power to
delegate authority to a committee.113 Pre-1996 corporations would remain subject to the old rule unless a majority of
the full board (as opposed to a majority of a quorum) agreed to adopt the new rule. The textually cumbersome result is
that section 141(c) has two different operative provisions, expressly divided chronologically. This is terribly ugly
drafting, of course, but was viewed as a necessary accommodation to protect preexisting expectations.114
There is a similarly unwieldy provision in DGCL section 102(b)(3),115 which eliminates preemptive rights as a
default rule going forward, but preserves those rights to the extent that they existed as of July 3, 1967, when the new
provision was adopted. One wonders just how long this chronological anomaly will remain in the Delaware statute, but
if it does remain there, the only explanation is the concern that some persons acquired shares before 1967, and they or
their successors are still relying on the existence of preemptive rights they enjoyed, by default, before the statute was
changed.
The broader point to be drawn from these examples is the second most commonly invoked heuristic I have
heard in Council meetings: Namely, that we should take care in amending the statute to avoid altering preexisting
commercial arrangements, even by negative implication. Thus, when amendments are made, the legislative synopses
accompanying those amendments often describe them as clarifications rather than as changes in the law.116 That
characterization, while undoubtedly overused, reflects an abiding desire to avoid a judicial inference that adopting a
new statutory articulation necessarily casts doubt on or changes the meaning of the old statute.
112

See Lewis S. Black, Jr. & Frederick H. Alexander, Analysis of the 1996 Amendments to the Delaware General Corporation
Law 313 (1996).
113
Tit. 8, § 141(c)(1).
114
Id.
115
Id. § 102(b)(3) (“All such [preemptive] rights in existence on July 3, 1967, shall remain in existence unaffected by this
paragraph unless and until changed or terminated by appropriate action which expressly provides for the change or termination.”).
116
The legislative synopsis of the 2004 amendments to the DGCL characterizes six of the eight amendments as clarifications of
existing law. 74 Del. Laws, c. 326 (2004). The synopsis also states that another amendment was drafted to negate any inference
of invalidity that might have been drawn (by a form of expressio unius reasoning) from the allowance of reference to outside facts
in merger agreements but not explicitly in other filed corporate documents such as certificates of incorporation. Id. The
temptation, of course, is to dismiss these changes as technical noodling. That would be a mistake. One of these changes clarified
the power of a board committee to nominate directors, despite the argument that such nomination by a committee would require
full board action because it involves recommending a matter for stockholder action. Trivial? Not at all, considering that stock
exchange listing standard changes had begun to suggest that nominating committees composed exclusively of independent
directors exercise sole authority to nominate directors. See New York Stock Exchange Manual, supra note 85, ¶ 303A.04(b)(1)
(stating nominating/corporate governance committee’s responsibility “to select, or to recommend that the board select, the director
nominees for the next annual meeting of shareholders”). It was certainly important to avoid any suggestion that hundreds of
nominating committees had lacked corporate power to fulfill their assigned function. See Frederick H. Alexander & Jeffrey R.
Wolters, Analysis of the 2004 Amendments to the Delaware General Corporation Law 3 (2004) (“[P]ractitioners had raised a
concern that a literal reading of the prohibition against committees approving matters that also require a stockholder vote might
preclude the use of nominating committees . . . . The 2004 amendments clarify that this is not the intent of the statute.”).
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C.

Deference to Common Law Development/Resistance to Regulatory Prescription

The desire to avoid interference with preexisting commercial relationships also emerges in the previously
mentioned unwritten but longstanding corollary rule of the Council: namely, that the Council will not put forward
legislative recommendations relating to a matter that is in active litigation.117 The only apparent exception to this rule
is in the situation where the matter is almost constantly or continually in litigation, and a legislative solution would be
precluded by rigid adherence to the general rule.118
This deference to the judicial branch rests on broader principles than a desire to avoid legislative intrusion into a
current case or controversy. Kahan and Rock correctly describe these principles when they characterize Delaware
corporate law as a “throwback” and “determinedly old-fashioned.”119 Like Fisch before them, they correctly note a
decided preference for “incremental legislation” and for broad statutory rules, or no statutory rules at all, as is largely
the case with respect to fiduciary duty issues, and a corresponding preference that the details of corporate law should be
sketched in through the judicial process.120 Thus, Delaware corporate lawmakers embrace the idea that legal issues that
depend for their resolution on complex facts cannot and should not be reduced to black letter codification.
The most important illustration of this idea involves the definition of fiduciary obligations. By their nature
equitable and fact-bound, fiduciary duties resist, and may even suffer from, codification. Valiant attempts have been
made, for example, to create a bright-line framework for judicial assessment of transactions in which directors have a
conflict of interest. The Model Business Corporation Act has included such an attempt since 1988 by adopting
subchapter F,121 and that attempt was extensively revised in 2004. Delaware lawmakers are hardly unaware of this
attempt.122 Whatever admiration there may be for the precision and intellectual effort reflected in the attempt, however,
the Council has manifested no interest in importing the bright-line Model Act approach into the Delaware General
Corporation Law.
The legislative choices reflected in the 2005 amendment to DGCL section 271 reflect similar values. For many
years section 271 had left unclear whether the sale of a subsidiary’s assets, where they accounted for all or substantially
all of the assets of the parent corporation on its consolidated balance sheet, should be deemed to trigger the stockholder
vote requirement of section 271.123 Soon after the Hollinger decision in 2004,124 the Council took up the question of
how to clarify the subject of sales of subsidiary assets, reflecting its consistent desire to avoid unnecessary uncertainty
over the operation of technical rules, such as when a stockholder vote is required. What emerged the following year
was an amendment that attempted such a clarification, to the extent of establishing that sales out of a wholly owned and
117

See supra text accompanying notes 34--35; supra Part III.
For example, the 2003 amendments to DGCL section 220 almost inevitably had some bearing on pending or incipient
litigation, since books and records inspection cases are brought frequently. Waiting to make those changes until “the coast was
clear” would have meant never making them at all.
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Kahan & Rock, supra note 2, at 1610.
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Id. at 1611; Fisch, supra note 2, at 1098--99.
121
Comm. on Corporate Laws, Changes in the Model Business Corporation Act---Amendments Pertaining to Directors'
Conflicting Interest Transactions, 44 Bus. Law. 1307, 1307 (1989).
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Indeed, Delaware Supreme Court Justice Jack Jacobs co-chaired the task force responsible for revising subchapter F. See
Comm. on Corporate Laws, Changes in the Model Business Corporation Act---Proposed Amendments Relating to Chapter 1 and
Chapter 8 (Including Subchapters F and G and Duties of Directors and Officers), 59 Bus. Law. 569 (2004).
123
The history of this issue is reviewed in detail in Hollinger, Inc. v. Hollinger Int’l Inc., 858 A.2d 342, 373--75 (Del. Ch. 2004).
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Id. at 342.
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controlled subsidiary are deemed to constitute sales of the parent’s own assets.125 That amendment did not, however,
resolve the treatment of asset transfers to or by subsidiaries that are less than “wholly owned,” nor did it attempt to
define the terms “owned” or “controlled.” It was of course recognized that cases could arise that would present these
unresolved issues. On balance, however, it was felt that a clear resolution of the most common problem---transfers to
or by wholly owned subsidiaries---would contribute much in the way of clarity, and that attempting to do more would
prove unwieldy and confusing. Most important for present purposes, Council members felt that the Delaware courts
would be best suited to supply interpretations of the underlying statute to the extent that it remained unclear in its
application.
The exception that most vividly proves the rule asserted in this section---that Delaware prefers broad legislative
rules and their development through specific judicial application---is Delaware’s takeover statute, DGCL section
203.126 That statute has the same look and feel as an SEC regulation: It contains an extensive definitional section,
numerically specific hurdles that define its operation, and most notably, it contains a regulatory prohibition against
“business combinations,” as defined in the statute. In its length, complexity, and proscriptive quality, section 203 is
unique in the DGCL. Likewise, section 203 is unique in its adoption: It was intentionally exposed for public comment,
received plenty, and was the subject of extensive legislative hearings, with testimony from a variety of academics and
regulators, and not just Delaware lawyers.127 Thus, section 203 represents Delaware corporate lawmaking at the
margin, not at the core. It is an aberration, and must be and has been explained not as an outcome of ordinary Delaware
lawmaking, but as an aberrational response to an unusual confluence of competitive pressures.128 That section 203
stands out as it does highlights the ordinary preference for general, nonprescriptive and nonproscriptive rules.
The preference for common law development, however, should not be taken as legislative indifference or
impotence. While admiring their attention to the life of Delaware corporate law, I disagree in this regard with Kahan
and Rock to the extent that they suggest that the Delaware General Assembly is extraordinarily reluctant to reject
decisions by the Delaware courts and has done so in only one significant case.129 While Delaware has no great interest
in emphasizing internal disharmony over matters of corporate law,130 I would consider the following to be instances of
legislative rejection of or at least response to judicial action on significant corporate law issues:
•

In 1997 the General Assembly amended DGCL section 211 to make clear that stockholder action to
elect directors by written consent could obviate the need for an annual meeting of stockholders for that
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H.R. 150, 143d Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Del. 2005). In accordance with that determination, transfers of assets from a parent
corporation to a wholly owned and controlled subsidiary would not be deemed a sale of assets by the parent.
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Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 203 (2006).
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See Drexler et al., supra note 8, § 23.01 (describing how adoption of section 203 followed “a fervid campaign, which included
full-page ads, mass mailings, radio commercials, national and local, editorials pro and con, and two full days of public legislative
hearings at which all aspects were thoroughly aired”). See generally Practicing Law Inst., The New Delaware Takeover Statute
(1988) (compiling collection of legislative hearing transcripts and letters from government regulators on proposed takeover
statutes); Craig B. Smith & Clark W. Furlow, Guide to the Takeover Law of Delaware: A Practical Guide for the Corporate
Counselor (1988).
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See supra text accompanying notes 723--78.
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According to Kahan and Rock, the General Assembly has overruled only one significant corporate law decision. Kahan &
Rock, supra note 2, at 1596 (noting that with exception of director liability aspect of Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del.
1985), “we are not aware of any significant corporate law decision in Delaware that has been legislatively overruled”).
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See Randy J. Holland & David A. Skeel, Jr., Deciding Cases Without Controversy, 5 Del. L. Rev. 115, 118 (2002); David A.
Skeel, Jr., The Unanimity Norm in Delaware Corporate Law, 83 Va. L. Rev. 127, 129 (1997)..
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•

•

•

purpose. The previous year the Court of Chancery had ruled to the contrary,131 despite the view that
“most practitioners believed, at least in the case of corporations whose shares are not publicly traded,
that it was indeed permissible to obtain stockholder consent in lieu of holding an annual meeting.”132 In
an extended footnote, Kahan and Rock briefly describe this action but dismiss the subject as “narrow”
and not “significant.”133 That characterization is questionable, however, in light of the torrent of
criticism from institutional investors elicited by a subsequent amendment that similarly permitted the
corporation to avoid conducting stockholder meetings in person.134
Kahan and Rock correctly describe as significant, on the other hand, a 1998 amendment permitting
merger agreements to “require that the agreement be submitted to the stockholders whether or not the
board of directors determines at any time subsequent to declaring its advisability that the agreement is
no longer advisable and recommends that the stockholders reject it.”135 Although belated, this 1998
amendment was a direct response to and reversal of the Delaware Supreme Court’s insistence in Smith v.
Van Gorkom that the board of directors could not, consistent with the governing statute, commit to
submitting a merger to a stockholder vote if it could no longer recommend that the stockholders approve
it.136
As Kahan and Rock point out in their extended footnote on the subject, DGCL section 231(d), added in
1990, reversed a 1989 ruling that invalidated the practice under which election inspectors could contact
brokers to clear up broker “over-votes.”137 They correctly note that the Court of Chancery’s ruling was
consistent with longstanding precedent, and there is no suggestion here that the court made a mistake.138
What this event does show, rather, is the willingness and ability of the Council and the General
Assembly to overturn judicial rulings when necessary or desirable when changed practices call for
changed legal rules.139
In 2000 DGCL section 122 was amended to add a subsection (17) conferring power upon the
corporation to renounce, in advance, its interest or expectancy in “specified business opportunities or
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Hoschett v. TSI Int’l Software, Ltd., 683 A.2d 43 (Del. Ch. 1996).
Lewis S. Black, Jr. & Frederick H. Alexander, Analysis of the 1997 Amendments to the Delaware General Corporation Law
313 (1997) (acknowledging that before TSI was decided “it was an open question whether the right of stockholders to act by
written consent . . . could serve as a substitute for the annual meeting”).
133
Kahan & Rock, supra note 2, at 1596 n.90.
134
In 2000 the DGCL was amended to provide for the convening of “virtual annual meetings,” a change that was described as
permitting boards to avoid face-to-face confrontation with investors. See, e.g., Olga Kharif, Let’s Take an E-meeting, Bus. Wk.,
July 31, 2000, at 8 (quoting Nell Minow’s suggestion that with adoption of “virtual meeting” provisions of DGCL section 211,
managers can “incorporate in Delaware and never have to look [the] shareholders in the eye again”).
135
Kahan & Rock, supra note 2, at 1602 n.109 (quoting 71 Del. Laws c. 339 (1998) (adding Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 251(c)
(1998))). In 2003, this provision was broadened to apply to other matters submitted to a stockholder vote, and was placed in a
new section 146.
136
488 A.2d 873, 887--88 (Del. 1985).
137
Kahan & Rock, supra note 2, at 1596 n.90 (citing Concord Fin. Group v. Tri-State Motor Transit Co. of Del., 567 A.2d 1, 6
(Del. Ch. 1989)).
138
The case was decided by Justice Randy Holland sitting by designation as a Chancellor, and relied on the Delaware Supreme
Court’s 1971 opinion in Williams v. Sterling Oil of Okla., 273 A.2d 264, 265 (Del. 1971).
139
See Lewis S. Black, Jr. & A. Gilchrist Sparks III, Analysis of the 1990 Amendments to the Delaware General Corporation Law
315--16 (1990) (noting that old rule against election inspector consideration of matters beyond proxies and corporation’s own
records “had the potential to disenfranchise large numbers of stockholders” given evolved phenomenon of broker overvotes (i.e.,
“when a broker . . . which holds shares for various accounts in ‘street’ name votes more shares than the corporation’s stockholder
list reflects that it holds”)).
132
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specified classes or categories of business opportunities that are presented to the corporation or one or
more of its officers, directors or stockholders.”140 This change was brought about largely in an effort to
dispel uncertainty arising from a Chancery decision that had called into question the formal power of a
corporation to adopt charter provisions that would accomplish such a renunciation of any corporate
interest in defined business opportunities.141
This list of instances of legislative rejection of judicial rulings tells less than half the pertinent story, however.
If the story is of a legislature that is attentive to changes in the business environment and is active in responding to such
changes, it is just as important to note that the Council and the Delaware General Assembly are often responsive when
the courts themselves report matters that merit legislative attention. For example, in 2002 the Court of Chancery was
confronted with litigation in which a critical fact issue was the time of filing of a corporate instrument.142 Noting an
informal and usually benign practice of the Delaware Division of Corporations to allow backdated filings on a limited
basis, the Court of Chancery fired the proverbial shot across the bow, predicting that with the advent of modern
technology filing time can be readily and definitively established, and that the unfortunate events of the case at hand
“doubtless will set in motion revised practices to effect this result.”143 Not content to let a matter so critical to the
operation of the corporate system await resolution for even six months, when the usual round of DGCL amendments
could be expected to become effective, the General Assembly adopted amendments to DGCL section 103 establishing
a firm antibackdating rule.144
Another example---not quite a judicial plea for legislative action, nor quite a legislative reversal of a judicial
ruling---comes from the Digex145 opinion from 2001. In that case, the Court of Chancery found some merit---without
ruling definitively, to be sure---in the assertion that the acquisition of shares constituting fifty-two percent in number
but ninety-four percent in voting power would not be sufficient to satisfy section 203’s requirement that to avoid the
statutory moratorium on business combinations, an acquirer needs to obtain over eighty-five percent of the “voting
stock” in the transaction in which it first acquires fifteen percent or more of the outstanding stock.146 In response to the
Digex opinion, DGCL section 203 was promptly amended to establish the opposite result, making clear that in applying
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72 Del. Laws. c. 343 (2000).
See Siegman v. Tri-Star Pictures, Inc., 1989 Del. Ch. LEXIS 56, at *23--*27 (Del. Ch. May 30, 1989). The legislative synopsis
accompanying the adoption of section 122(17) describes its purpose as to “eliminate uncertainty regarding the power of a
corporation to renounce corporate opportunities in advance.” 72 Del. L., c. 343. That uncertainty stemmed directly from the
Siegman case. See Lewis S. Black, Jr. & Frederick H. Alexander, Analysis of the 2000 Amendments to the Delaware General
Corporation Law 2 (2000). The pressure to address that uncertainty stemmed from the certainty enjoyed by noncorporate entities
whose governing instruments renounced in advance what might otherwise be enterprise opportunities. See, e.g., U.S. Cellular Inv.
Co. v. Bell Atlantic Mobile Sys., 677 A.2d 497, 504 (Del. 1996) (noting provisions of limited partnership agreement permitting
partners to provide service in competition with limited partnership and applying section 17-1101(d) of Delaware Revised Uniform
Limited Partnership Act to affirm dismissal of fiduciary duty claims asserting usurpation of limited partnership opportunities).
142
Liebermann v. Frangiosa, 844 A.2d 992, 1007 (Del. Ch. 2002) (rejecting claim that backdated certificate of designation of
rights and preferences authorized issuance of preferred stock that preceded and thereby thwarted common stockholder written
consent to remove directors).
143
Id. at 37 n.49.
144
Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 103(c)(3) (2006), added by 74 Del. Laws c. 118 (2003).
145
In re Digex Inc. S’holders Litig., 789 A.2d 1176 (Del. Ch. 2001).
146
Id. at 1199 (“The statute . . . seems to place the emphasis in the term ‘voting stock’ on the term ‘stock’ and not the term
‘voting.’”).
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the percentages specified in that statute, the term “voting stock” refers to the percentage of voting power associated
with that stock.147
The point is not to demonstrate the attentiveness of Delaware’s corporate lawmakers; rather, it is to suggest that
even though the Council and the General Assembly are not passive participants in the lawmaking process in Delaware,
they do---despite their attentiveness and willingness to act---overwhelmingly prefer to let corporate lawmaking occur
without detailed regulatory prescription. And they prefer that the courts be the first responders to controversies in
applying Delaware corporate law, at least in those matters that defy clarification through simple legislation or
codification.
D. Flexibility and the Facilitation of Private Ordering
Delaware’s corporate laws are by no means a blank check for private ordering.148 On the other hand, and like
the Model Business Corporation Act and most other state statutes, the DGCL establishes default rules on central
matters, such as economic rights and voting rights of stock, that can be changed by private agreement almost without
limit.149 There has been a strong tendency in Delaware corporate policymaking to broaden that room for private
ordering. In contrast to the prevailing reluctance to alter substantive corporate law rules,150 proposals to enhance
private ordering in ways that do not alter fundamental aspects of the system, such as judicial enforcement of fiduciary
duties or the allocation of control as between directors and stockholders, are almost presumptively approved.
Before 2004, the DGCL permitted merger agreements to include provisions whose actual operation would
depend on facts ascertainable from information not in the agreement itself.151 The DGCL also permitted charter
provisions to define in this fashion the rights of shares of stock.152 Until 2004, however, the DGCL did not permit
147

Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 203(c)(8) (2002) (“Every reference to a percentage of voting stock shall refer to such percentage of the
votes of such voting stock.”).
148
By and large, the fiduciary duties of directors are nonwaivable, mandatory terms of the corporate contract. See Siegman v. TriStar Pictures, Inc., 1989 Del. Ch. LEXIS 56, at *26 (Del. Ch. May 30, 1989), aff’d in part and rev’d on other grounds, In re TriStar Pictures, Inc. Litig., 634 A.2d 319 (Del. 1993). The limited exceptions---DGCL sections 102(b)(7) (permitting charter
elimination of monetary liability of directors for breach of fiduciary duty except in specified circumstances) and 122(17)
(permitting advance renunciation of corporate opportunities)---reflect the generally mandatory character of director fiduciary
duties. Where appraisal rights exist, they may not be eliminated by the corporate contract. Cf. In re Appraisal of Ford Holdings,
Inc. Preferred Stock, 698 A.2d 973, 976 (Del. Ch. 1997) (describing appraisal rights as “mandatory,” but holding that preferred
stock terms can enforceably prescribe consideration to be received by preferred stock in mergers to exclusion of appraisal
remedy). Stockholder inspection rights are yet another mandatory feature of the DGCL. In contrast, Delaware’s noncorporate
entity laws, with their explicit policy of maximizing freedom of contract among business participants, allow the governing
participants’ agreement to modify all of these organizational rules. See, e.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, § 18-210 (2006) (allowing
contractual appraisal rights); id. § 18-1101(e) (permitting elimination of fiduciary duties); id. § 18-305(a) (permitting limitations
on inspection rights).
149
E.g., tit. 8, § 212(a) (explaining that one share/one vote default rule can be overridden by provision of certificate of
incorporation); id. § 151(c) (explaining that certificate of incorporation may provide for special or preferential dividend rights).
150
See supra Part III.A.
151
Tit. 8, § 251(b) (providing that “Any . . . terms . . . may be made dependent upon facts ascertainable outside of such agreement,
provided that the manner in which such facts shall operate upon the terms of the agreement is clearly and expressly set forth in the
agreement of merger or consolidation” and that “[t]he term ’facts,’ as used in the preceding sentence, includes, but is not limited
to, the occurrence of any event, including a determination or action by any person or body, including the corporation”)
152
Tit. 8, § 151(a).

- -

26

other charter provisions to be made dependent on outside facts. This limitation was at least a mild practical drawback:
It might be useful, for instance, to define matters relating to corporate duration, board composition, or indemnification
by reference to economic or operating conditions that evolve outside of the four corners of the certificate of
incorporation. Accordingly, DGCL section 102(d) was adopted to expand the range of permitted use of the “facts
ascertainable” technique.153 And as with the preexisting provisions relating to merger and stock terms, the new section
102(d) even allowed ascertainable “facts” to include determinations by the corporation itself.154
This flexibility-enhancing proposal was obviously well received, but its potential for abuse did not go
unnoticed. If a proposed section 102(d) provision, for example, permitted a board to determine unilaterally, as a “fact,”
that the size of the board (otherwise fixed by charter, say) must be expanded, couldn’t the board invoke that provision
and thereby eliminate an otherwise bargained-for element of control on the part of one or more stockholders?
Proponents of the statutory change had to acknowledge that such an abuse was at least technically and theoretically
possible. Their responses to that potential abuse prevailed, however, and are instructive with respect to the policies
underlying Delaware corporate law. First, they said, one should start with the assumption that unusual governance
provisions taking advantage of the new flexibility will occur primarily in privately negotiated arrangements in which
the governing terms---even ones with potential for abuse---are understood, appropriately priced, and voluntarily
embraced. Second, and conversely, it is unlikely that corporations would go public with charters containing such openended provisions. And finally---and this is the most telling in terms of statutory policy---it was urged, successfully,
that if corporate directors were to abuse an open-ended charter term authorized by new section 102(d), the Delaware
courts are well armed with doctrines and remedial powers sufficient to address such abuse.155
Thus, the legislative preference for flexibility and private ordering is ultimately dependent on what we believe
to be a well-founded view that the courts will police overly opportunistic behavior on the part of those in control.156 As
long as the courts more or less sensibly call the balls and strikes---that is, remedy managerial behavior that unduly
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74 Del. Laws. 422 (2004).
Frederick H. Alexander & Jeffrey R. Wolters, Analysis of the 2004 Amendments to the Delaware General Corporation Law 2
(2004).
155
To the extent that the questioned conduct could be said to be addressed by application of the contractual term of the certificate
of incorporation, it may be that this conduct would be evaluated only to determine whether it breached the contractual implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing; otherwise, the directors’ conduct might be reviewed under fiduciary duty principles. See
HB Korenvaes Invs. L.P. v. Marriott Corp., No, 12.922, 1993 Del. Ch. LEXIS 90 (Del. Ch. June 9, 1993).
156
Perhaps the most striking Delaware court opinions are those which invalidate managerial behavior that literally and technically
complies with the governing statutes, but which is deemed to operate inequitably. Schnell v. Chris-Craft, 285 A.2d 437, 439 (Del.
1971) (“[I]nequitable action does not become permissible simply because it is legally possible.”), is the landmark case of this sort.
See also Adlerstein v. Wertheimer, 2002 Del. Ch. LEXIS 13, at *36 (Del. Ch. Jan. 25, 2002) (holding against board of directors
despite evidence that its actions might have been legal because actions involved “trickery or deceit”); Hubbard v. Hollywood Park
Realty Enter., Inc., 1991 Del. Ch. LEXIS 9, at *22 (Del. Ch. Jan. 14, 1991) (“[W]here directors take action that, while legally
permissible, is done for an inequitable purpose, such action is a breach of fiduciary duty that may be remedied by equity.”);
Blasius Indus. Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 658 (Del. Ch. 1988) (stating that board’s self-expansion would have been breach
of duty if done for selfish reasons); Aprahamian v. HBO & Co., 531 A.2d 1204, 1207--08 (Del. Ch. 1987) (citing Schnell in
finding that board of directors acted selfishly in postponing annual meeting); Lerman v. Diagnostic Data, Inc., 421 A.2d 906, 913-14 (Del. Ch. 1980) (same). See generally Leo E. Strine, Jr., If Corporate Action is Lawful, Presumably There Are Circumstances
in Which It’s Equitable to Take That Action: The Important Corollary to the Rule of Schnell v. Chris-Craft, 60 Bus. Law. 877
(2005).
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defeats reasonable expectations while blessing behavior that does not---the Council and the General Assembly can
comfortably expand the realm of private flexibility in the DGCL.157
From time to time, exogenous changes---notably technological developments---open up opportunities and
render old legal rules obsolete and unintentionally restrictive. In such situations, the DGCL must respond, if only to
permit private ordering and commercial practices to avoid being hamstrung by existing statutory restraints. The socalled “technology amendments” of 2000 again illustrate how Delaware lawmakers go about designing statutes to
increase their flexibility (and thereby utility) for the users of corporate law.158 Because so much of corporate law
involves communication---including notices, meetings, proxies, votes, and information access---the technological
revolution in information transmission that occurred at the end of the twentieth century required a serious overhaul of
corporate laws that still prescribed “mailing” of notices, “written” signatures, and the like.159
The core of the 2000 technology amendments was a definition of “electronic transmission” that would be
applicable throughout the DGCL,160 a term that was then used to augment permissible means of communicating
corporate matters such as director resignations and consents, submission of a stockholder ballot, and waivers of
notice.161
The details of the 2000 technology amendments, however, are not the focus of this discussion. They are
referred to here because the committee of the Council undertook to draft them in a manner that was unusually explicit
about the policy parameters of the task.162 In defining those parameters, the committee proceeded from the following
articulation of the basic policies of Delaware corporate law:
[T]he drafters sought to continue the hallmarks of the General Corporation Law: predictability and flexibility.
Accordingly, the amendments were framed to: (1) be enabling and not mandatory, (2) operate fairly and
maintain the current balance of powers and responsibilities among the corporation and its constituencies, (3)
anticipate further advances in technology, (4) be flexible in application, and (5) offer economic efficiency and
cost savings.163
157

Vice Chancellor Strine ably articulated this symbiotic relationship between the General Assembly and the Delaware judiciary
in Hollinger Int’l Inc. v. Black, 844 A.2d 1022, 1078 (Del. Ch. 2004), aff’d 872 A.2d 559 (Del. 2005):
The DGCL is intentionally designed to provide directors and stockholders with flexible authority, permitting great
discretion for private ordering and adaptation. That capacious grant of power is policed in large part by the common law
of equity, in the form of fiduciary duty principles. The judiciary deploys its equitable powers cautiously to avoid
intruding on the legitimate scope of action the DGCL leaves to directors and officers acting in good faith. The business
judgment rule embodies that commitment to proper judicial restraint. At the same time, Delaware’s public policy interest
in vindicating the legitimate expectations stockholders have of their corporate fiduciaries requires its courts to act when
statutory flexibility is exploited for inequitable ends.
158
See James L. Holzman & Thomas A. Mullen, A New Technology Frontier for Delaware Corporations, 4 Del. L. Rev. 55
passim (2001) (describing background and content of year 2000 technology amendments).
159
The DGCL had already addressed issues like this before 2000. See, e.g., Act of July 17, 1990, ch. 376, 67 Del. Laws 809
(validating datagram proxies and confirming result in Parshalle v. Roy, 567 A.2d 19 (1989)). The amendments in 2000, however,
were a comprehensive effort to address these issues. See Holzman & Mullen, supra note 159, at 55--56.
160
Id. at 56 (describing Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 232(c) (2001)).
161
Tit. 8, § 141(b), amended by 75 Del. Laws 306 (2006); tit. 8, §§ 141(f), 211(e) & 229.
162
The committee’s report is not publicly available, but its chair subsequently published a description of the amendments that goes
into great depth in explaining the committee’s work and rationale. Holzman & Mullen, supra note 159, at 56.
163
Id.
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Here, in a carefully crafted nutshell, is a clear expression of at least what the Delaware lawmakers think they are
doing. Clearly, these amendments were also promoted with an awareness that they might enhance Delaware’s
reputation and desirability as a choice of corporate domicile.164 One can always dismiss any attempt at promoting
efficiency as an effort to bolster a state’s competitive position. What is notable, however, is how Delaware’s
policymakers conceived, and continue to conceive, of the considerations that guide them in developing the corporate
law.
IV. Conclusion and Predictions
Two principal agencies---the Delaware judiciary and the Delaware General Assembly, guided by the Council of
the Corporation Law Section of the Delaware State Bar Association---develop Delaware corporate law. These two
agencies act symbiotically: The legislature crafts the broad, largely flexible framework for private ordering of
corporate affairs in the knowledge that the judiciary will protect such flexibility while applying equitable principles of
fiduciary duty to rein in particularly opportunistic behavior that defeats the legitimate expectations of other corporate
participants.
Over the years, commentators have described Delaware corporate lawmaking in a variety of ways, suggesting
that the course and content of Delaware corporate law are dictated by a desire to “race to the bottom,” or to “race to the
top.” More recently, however, closer observers have recognized that federal authorities exert a powerful influence,
through the adoption or potential adoption of corporate law rules, which limits the extent to which Delaware can “race”
with other states in the development of corporate law.
With the exception of Kahan and Rock, however, none of these observers attend much to the heuristics that
Delaware’s corporate law policymakers routinely invoke as they shape the development of Delaware corporate law.
Those heuristics are: (1) an abiding conservatism, in the sense of a reluctance to make any change without clear
evidence that significant benefits (primarily in the form of convenience or clarity) will result; (2) a related desire to
protect commercial relationships and expectations that have been built up in reference to preexisting legal rules; (3) a
preference that the details of corporate law be shaped in a common law fashion, with courts as first responders to
tensions within the corporate law, at least in areas that are not susceptible to simple statutory clarification; and (4) a
preference for enhancement of private ordering opportunities, so long as the basic scheme of fiduciary duty principles
and the allocation of authority among directors, officers, and stockholders remains essentially unchanged.
These policy foundations will not shift easily, and they will significantly shape the future path of the federal and
state roles in establishing the ground rules of public company governance. Specifically, as efforts emerge seeking
reform on a range of corporate governance subjects---executive compensation, proxy access, majority voting, audit,
compensation, and governance committees of the board, for example---Delaware can be expected to seek to afford
corporate participants a wide range of privately determined resolutions. Do not expect the Delaware courts or the
Delaware legislature, however, to either create detailed regulatory schemes that address these subjects or to alter the
existing body of corporate law rules in ways that significantly affect these aspects of corporate governance. If and to
the extent that political pressures in Washington result in regulatory responses in these areas---as occurs from time to
time---Delaware will most likely be an interested but largely inactive bystander. There will always be debate about
164

Id. (“The enactment of the legislation not only keeps Delaware in the forefront of corporation law, but also makes it,
appropriately, the ‘First State’ broadly to embrace modern communication technology as an effective corporate governance
tool.”).
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whether such federal regulatory initiatives are useful or counterproductive;165 but again, Delaware will largely be on the
sidelines, implicitly supporting the conservative view that more regulation is not necessarily better and calling upon
those who advocate regulatory change to refrain from a too ready assumption that such change is the answer to
problems real or perceived.

165

Compare Chandler & Strine, supra note 33, at 957 (expressing cautious optimism at Sarbanes-Oxley corporate regulations),
and Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn: Heavy Rhetoric, Light Reform (And It Just Might Work), 35 U.
Conn. L. Rev. 915, 919 (2003) (arguing in favor of regulations), with Larry E. Ribstein, Market v. Regulatory Responses to
Corporate Fraud: A Critique of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 28 J. Corp. L. 1, 3 (2002) (arguing against regulations), and
Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance, 114 Yale L.J. 1521, 1602 (2005)
(same).
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Appendix A
Appearances by Delaware Judges at Public Forums on Corporate Law
2003--2006166
Judge
Steele167

Date/Location
Jan. 16, 2004, New
York, NY

Role
Speaker

Event
Directors’ Roundtable, Dialogue on Corporate
Governance with Leadership of the SEC and the
Delaware Supreme Court
Journal of Corporation Law Annual Banquet

“

Feb. 7, 2004,
University of Iowa
Law School

Keynote speaker

“

Panelist
Aug. 5, 2004,
American Bar
Association Annual
Meeting, Atlanta,
GA

“

Oct. 20, 2004,
University of
Delaware Center
for Corporate
Governance

Speaker

Executive Compensation Conference

“

Oct. 22, 2004,
Wilmington, DE

Keynote speaker

International Corporate Governance Network
Conference

“

Oct. 29, 2004,
SMU Law School

Keynote speaker

Twelfth Annual SMU Corporate Counsel
Symposium

“

Jan. 19--21, 2005,
San Diego, CA

Panelist

Thirty-Second Annual Securities Regulation
Institute

ABA Judicial Division Program on Business
Valuations and Corporate and Commercial
Litigation

166

This inventory of public appearances by members of the Delaware judiciary is certainly not complete, if for no other reason
than that it is limited to appearances recorded during the period since 2003, and it is limited to current judges, and then only some
of them. These judges also regularly attend programs sponsored by Widener University School of Law (such as the annual
Francis X. Pileggi Lecture). Similarly, many judges regularly attend the Institute of Law and Economics of the University of
Pennsylvania’s events, such as its Roundtable discussions of corporate law issues. This inventory also does not recite the various
judges’ law school teaching engagements (such as Justice Jacobs’s teaching at Widener Law School and New York University
Law School, Chancellor Chandler’s teaching at Widener and Moritz College of Law at Ohio State University, Vice Chancellor
Lamb’s teaching at New York University Law School, and Vice Chancellor Strine’s teaching at the University of Pennsylvania
Law School and Harvard Law School).
167
Myron T. Steele, Jr., Chief Justice, Delaware Supreme Court.

- -

31

“
“
“

“
“
“

“

“
“
“
“
Jacobs168

“
“
“

“
“
“

Feb. 16, 2005, New
York, NY
Feb. 16--18, 2005,
Coconut Grove, FL
Mar. 3, 2005,
University of
Pennsylvania
June 9, 2005, New
York, NY
July 7, 2005,
London, England
Oct. 26--28, 2005,
University of
Delaware
Oct. 27, 2005,
NYU Journal of
Law and Liberty
Oct. 27--28, 2005,
UCLA Law School
Nov. 8, 2005, New
York, NY
Feb. 10, 2006,
Dallas, TX
May 19, 2006,
NYU Law School
Apr. 11, 2003,
Widener Law
School
Oct. 16, 2003,
Hong Kong, China
Nov. 20, 2003,
New York, NY
Nov. 29, 2003,
Hamburg,
Germany
Jan. 19, 2004, San
Francisco, CA
Feb. 26, 2004,
UCLA Law School
Mar. 3, 2004,
Tulane Law School

Panelist and lunch
speaker
Speaker
Speaker

Keynote speaker

Hostile Deals and Takeover Defense
Twenty-Third Annual Institute on Federal
Securities
Distinguished Jurist Lecture

Speaker

Fourth International Mergers and Acquisitions
Conference
International Corporate Governance Network
Global Summit on Corporate Governance
Directors’ College

Participant

Online Symposium on Sarbanes-Oxley

Speaker

Second Annual Institute on Corporate, Securities,
and Related Aspects of Mergers and Acquisitions
Conference Board Directors’ Institute

Presenter

Keynote speaker
Panelist
Keynote speaker

Twenty-Eighth Annual Securities Regulation and
Business Law
2006 NYU Directors’ Institute

Panelist

Symposium on Duties in Unincorporated
Associations169

Presenter
Lecturer

Asian Corporate Governance Association
Conference
Fordham University Murphy Conference

Keynote speaker

Bucerius Law School

Presenter

Conference Board Directors’ Institute

Speaker

Mergers and Acquisitions Institute

Panelist

Corporate Law Institute

168

Jack B. Jacobs, Justice, Delaware Supreme Court.
The Convergence of Fiduciary Duties in Unincorporated and Incorporated Entities: The Issue, Its Implications, Its Limitations:
A Live Symposium, April 11, 2003, Panel IV: “Questions to Symposium Participants,” 28 Del. J. Corp. L. 999 (2003).

169
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“

“

“

“
“
“
“
“
“
“

“
“

“

“

“

“

Mar. 25, 2004,
Vanderbilt Law
School
Apr. 16, 2004,
University Virginia
Law School
Apr. 19, 2004,
Fordham Law
School
May 24, 2004,
New York, NY
June 15, 2004,
New York, NY
Oct. 22, 2004,
Wilmington, DE
Nov. 1, 2004,
Seoul, Korea
Jan. 25, 2005,
UCLA Law School
Apr. 12, 2005,
Washington, DC
Apr. 14--15, 2005,
Northwestern Law
School
May 4, 2005,
London, England
Sep. 30, 2005,
Washington
University Law
School
Nov. 12, 2005,
University of
Tokyo
Mar. 20, 2006,
Stockholm,
Sweden
Apr. 17, 2006,
Amsterdam,
Netherlands
May 4, 2006,
Boston, MA

Keynote speaker

Fourth Annual Law and Business Conference

Lecturer

Colloquium on Corporate Law

Panelist

Roundtable---The Evolving Duty of Good Faith

Panelist/Keynote
speaker
Keynote speaker

Tenth Annual Merger and Acquisitions Lawyer
Institute
Conference Board Directors’ Institute

Panelist

International Corporate Governance Network

Presenter

Korean Development Institute

Lecturer

Michael T. Masin Lecture

Speaker

Council of Institutional Investors Spring
Conference
Twenty-Fifth Annual Ray Garrett Jr. Corporate
and Securities Law Institute

Participant

Panelist

European Mergers and Acquisitions Roundtable

Commentator

The New Corporate Governance Conference

Lecturer

International Center for Corporate Law and
Politics

Presenter

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development Conference---Resolution of
Corporate Governance Related Disputes
Ministry of Economic Affairs and Amsterdam
Center for Corporate Finance Conference

Presenter

Commentator

- -

American Law Institute-American Bar Ass’n
conference, Takeovers: Litigation Developments
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170

Holland

“

“
“
Chandler171
“
“

“
“
“

“
“

“
Lamb172
“

“

Nov. 18, 2003,
University of
Delaware
Sep. 24, 2004,
Vanderbilt Law
School
Oct. 22, 2004,
Wilmington, DE
Sep. 2, 2005,
University of Iowa
Law School
June 13, 2003,
Tokyo, Japan
June 17, 2004,
London, England
Aug. 5, 2004, ABA
annual meeting,
Atlanta, GA
Oct. 22, 2004,
Wilmington, DE
June 1, 2005, New
York, NY
Oct. 6, 2005,
Vanderbilt Law
School
Oct. 25, 2005,
Washington, DC
Feb. 28, 2006,
University of
Pennsylvania Law
School
Apr. 21, 2006,
Yale Law School
Oct. 20, 2003,
Washington, DC
Nov. 18, 2003,
University of
Delaware
Feb. 25-27, 2004,
UCLA Law School

Speaker

in Contested Deals and Proxy Battles
Shareholder Access to the Company Proxy

Participant

Directors’ College

Panelist

International Corporate Governance Network

Participant

Journal of Corporation Law Symposium

Speaker

Conference on Hostile Mergers and Acquisitions,
sponsored by Columbia Law School
Third International Mergers and Acquisitions
Conference
ABA Judicial Division program on Business
Valuations and Corporate and Commercial
Litigation
International Corporate Governance Network

Commentator
Panelist

Panelist
Speaker

International Bar Association Fourth Annual
Mergers and Acquisitions Conference
Directors’ College

Panelist

Keynote speaker
Panelist

Speaker

Colloquium on Contemporary Issues in Law and
Business
National Association of Corporate Directors 2003
Corporate Governance Conference
Panel, Shareholder Access to the Proxy

Panelist
Panelist

Speaker

First Annual Institute on Corporate, Securities
and Related Aspects of Mergers and Acquisitions
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Randy J. Holland, Justice, Delaware Supreme Court.
William B. Chandler III, Chancellor, Delaware Court of Chancery.
172
Stephen P. Lamb, Vice Chancellor, Delaware Court of Chancery.
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National Association of Corporate Directors 2005
Conference
Program on Technicolor
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Mar. 18, 2004,
USC Law School
Oct. 22, 2004,
Wilmington, DE
Oct. 22, 2004,
Philadelphia, PA
Oct. 24, 2004,
University of
Delaware
Oct. 31, 2005,
Chicago, IL
Mar. 24, 2006,
Washington and
Lee Law School
Oct. 3, 2003,
Harvard Law
School
Nov. 20, 2003,
University of
Delaware
Sep. 13, 2004, New
York, NY
Oct. 22, 2004,
Wilmington, DE
Dec. 10, 2004,
University of
Pennsylvania. Law
School
Mar. 17--18, 2005,
Duke Law School
Jan. 18, 2006, San
Diego, CA
Mar. 16, 2006,
Duke Law School

Panelist

2004 Institute for Corporate Control

Panelist

International Corporate Governance Network

Panelist

Business Lawyers’ Institute

Speaker

Executive Compensation Conference

Speaker (by video)

Second Annual Executive Compensation
Conference
Symposium, Understanding Corporate Law
Through History

Participant

Speaker

Program on Corporate Governance

Panelist

Program on SEC Proposals on Shareholder
Empowerment

Speaker, panelist
Panelist

Practising Law Institute Securities Litigation and
Enforcement Institute
International Corporate Governance Network

Panelist

Institute for Law and Economics Roundtable

Keynote speaker,
panelist
Panelist

Director’s Education Institute

Keynote speaker

Leo E. Strine, Jr., Vice Chancellor, Delaware Court of Chancery.

- -
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Thirty-Third Annual Securities Regulation
Institute
Directors’ Education Institute

